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DANGEROUS DRIVING. 
IS INTENT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT? 
REGINA v. HUNDAL - Supreme Court of Canada, March 1993. 79 C.C.C. (3d) 97. 
The accused drove an overloaded dump truck, slightly exceeding the speed limit, on the wet 
pavement of busy city streets. He clearly went through a red light, that had turned that colour 
several seconds before he entered the intersection. The truck collided broadside with a car the 
driver of which was killed instantly. The accused maintained that it was unsafe for him to stop 
his large truck, claimed that he entered the intersection on an amber light and had sounded his 
horn to warn the traffic. The evidence of witnesses was overwhelming and included a motorist 
who had followed the accused through 12 intersections and that this was the second intersection 
the accused entered as the light had just turned red. He was simply not believed and was 
convicted of dangerous driving causing death. He unsuccessfully appealed to the BC Court of 
Appeal and then took his plight to the Supreme Court of Canada, (S.C.C.). 
Dangerous driving is actually a regulatory offence, like those created by provincial statutes. The 
offence was for some years, removed from the criminal code and later re-introduced. It is 
supposed to fit somewhere in between careless driving and criminal negligent driving. It's 
definition is the section itself and in terms of the mens rea requirement the law has always been 
somewhat vague. 
In this case the defence lawyer argued that s. 7 of the Charter contains the fault requirement for 
criminal sanctions and that dangerous driving, if an objective standard must be satisfied and will 
suffice to convict, does not meet the s. 7 fault requirement. Since "dangerous driving causing 
death" has been added the issue of fault and intent have become more pressing. 
In 19661 the S.C.C. held that careless driving and dangerous driving are distinct offenses and 
the former is not a provincial duplication of the latter. Dangerous driving requires more than 
"inadvertent negligence". However in 19682 the S.C.C. approved a trial judge telling a jury 
that, " ..... .if you find on the facts that the manner of driving was dangerous in your opinion you 
may disregard the matter of intent." A . year later (1965)3) the SCC held that a jury must be 
instructed on the difference between advertent and inadvertent negligence when deciding a 
dangerous driving allegation, implying that the former (heedful conduct) is a requirement. 
1 Mann v. The Queen [1966] 2 C.C.C. 273. 
2 Binus v. The Queen [1968] 1 C.C.C. 227. 
3 Peda v. The Queen [1969] 4 C.C.C. 245. 
1 
In 19734 the Court of Appeal for Ontario, apparently having found no guidance from these 
contradictory decisions, devised a much followed objective test to determine if certain driving 
amounts to dangerous driving. It in essence said, "The lives and/or safety of others must have 
been jeopardized by the defendant's driving that must have amounted to a departure from the 
standard of care a prudent driver would have exercised in the circumstances". The Ontario 
Court reasoned that an explanation by the defendant may well bring his driving into that of a 
prudent driver. In the absence of an explanation, reading the section to a jury is sufficient 
direction. 
Defence counsel argued that the Charter does not allow this kind of objective test without any 
requirement of criminal intent for a person to become subject to be convicted of a criminal 
offence and be liable to a prison sentence. It was argued that there is, due to s. 7 of the 
Charter, a constitutional requirement for a criminal intent. In other words an objective test alone 
is unconstitutional. The S.C.C. held so in two decisions5 where statutes provided that there was 
liability to imprisonment without an element of fault. 
The S.C.C. held that the constitutional requirement of mens rea is broad and can be satisfied 
in different ways. This depends on the provisions of the enactment and its objective. Said the 
Court: 
"The offence can require proof of a positive state of mind such as 
intent, recklessness or wilful blindness. Alternatively, the mens 
rea or element of fault can be satisfied by proof of negligence 
whereby the conduct of the accused is measured on the basis of an 
objective standard without establishing the subjective mental state 
of the particular accused .... 
Negligence is subject to an objective test, held the SCC. All that is required for proof is a 
marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person. No intent is required. The 
nature of the "dangerous driving" offence suggests that a modified obj!(Ctive test is approptiate 
to determine fault. 
With regard to intent, the SCC reasoned that driving is a licensed activity requiring requisite 
skills before one can engage in the "regulated activity of driving". The rules of the road are 
known to the licensee as he/she has met the fixed standards. Secondly, to an experienced driver, 
driving is routine like, "taking a shower or going to work". It is therefore nearly impossible 
to determine the state of mind of a driver at a given moment. It would consequently be a denial 
of common sense to have criminal intent as an essential ingredient to driving offenses. Our 
4 R. v. Beaudoin (1973) 12 C.C.C. (2d) 81. 
5 BC Reference re: s. 94 (2) Motor Vehicle Act (1985) 23 C.C.C. (3d) 289. 
R. v. Vaillancourt (1987) 39 C.C.C. (3d) 118. 
2 
- statistics are like an indictment as too how many of us are maimed or killed on our streets and 
highways by means of this one activity, driving. If that many among us died of one disease an 
epidemic would be declared. For all of those reasons, it is justified that a moderate objective 
test be applied to determine if one drove dangerously. c.. · 
1be word •mocterate• is used to implement objective test considerations that Jessen the harshness 
.of it. Certain personal factors and •mistake of fact• must, where applicable, be considered: 
•Nevertheless, there should be a clear distinction in the law being 
one who was aware (pure subjective intent) and one who should 
have taken care irrespective of awareness (pure objective intent).• 
1be S.C.C. offers a number of examples, where despite the Crown having proved objective 
dangerous driving an accused should nonetheless be acquitted. These examples are not helpful 
as all are such, that the Crown would not likely prosecute in those circumstances. All include 
totally involuntary reactions that negate the wrongfulness of the act, e.g. unexpected heart 
attacks, detached retina, seizure or sudden onset of incapacitating diseases. 
In this case the road was wet, the traffic was heavy, the truck was overloaded by about 1200 kg 
and the driving was a gross departure from the standard of reasonable care. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
NOTE: 
A concurring judgement did give a better explanation of a •modified objective test• than the 
majority judgment. An objective test would mean that the Crown does not have to prove what 
the accused intended or what was in his/her mind. If the driving was dangerous the offence is 
complete. "Modified" means that an accused can despite the objective test, still raise a 
reasonable doubt as to· what a reasonable person would have thought in the situation in which 
the accused found him or herself. In other words a •modified objective test• is an objective test 
that is "not applied in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the events surrounding the 
incident". It is no defence to say, •1 was careful" or "I believed I could do what I did without 
undue risk". Only where a belief is reasonably held can it exonerate an accused person. An 
example of modified objective test was given by Mr. Justice Mcintyre in 1989'5. A welder, 
before lighting his torch in a confined space receives assurances from the owner that there are 
no combustible or explosive materials in that space or nearby. None are visible or detected by 
smell, yet an explosion occurs. A jury, in the circumstances, must be instructed to determine 
what a reasonable person would have thought and done. Was it reasonable for the welder to 
light his torch? The answer, on the modified objective test is, "Of course•. · 
6 Regina v. Tutton (1989) 48 C.C.C. (3d) 129. 
3 
DISCWSURE OF.CROWN LAWYER'S ADVISE TO POLICE. 
APPLICATION OF S. 37 CANADA EVIDENCE ACT. 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND PUBLIC INTEREST 
REGINA v. GRAY et al- Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA015664 
Gray and four other persons were charged with conspiracy to traffic narcotics. Police had 
adopted a unique investigative approach that in essence amounted to a reversed sting-operation. 
Instead of approaching the group of known drug dealers to buy the forbidden substances from 
them, police offered to supply them with $750,000.00 worth of stock and supplied them with 
a sample of their wares. A deal was made and when the accused came with cash money to 
complete the transaction, arrests were effected and the funds were seized as proceeds of crime. 
No warrants or any judicial licences were involved. Needless to say this was a circumvention 
from the conventional strategies; an innovative means to seize proceeds of crime and, in essence, 
police committed an unlawful act. 
At the preliminary stages of the criminal proceedings defence counsel included in his demands 
for disclosure the details of the communication between the officer in charge of this police action 
and the lawyer of the Justice Ministry who had rendered advice. The Crown objected and 
claimed there was a client-lawyer relationship involved and the communication was privileged. 
The BC Supreme Court disagreed7 and held that no privilege exists in these circumstances. 
The RCMP reacted by a Staff Officer applying to the BC Supreme Court for exclusion from the 
disclosure of the communications between the officer in charge and the f~eral government 
lawyer who advised him with regard to the operation. The officer in his application under s. 
37 of the Canada Evidence Act made the following points: 
1. Disclosure will be injurious to relations between police and Crown Counsel. No full and 
frank discussions can be expected if the content becomes part of disclosure. 
2. Disclosure will impair the administration of justice. Prosecutors will become 
compellable witnesses in every significant trial to disclose what advice, if any, they gave 
to police. Crown Counsel will become very reluctant to render any advice. 
3. The public is entitled to protection from crime. Police must have access to legal advice 
to combat criminal activities with increased sophistication to keep abreast of the criminal 
element. Also the legal system has become more complex and advice from legal experts 
will avoid the infringements of Charter rights and prevent expensive and unsuccessful 
police activities. 
7 Regina v. Gray et al - Volume 42, page 2 of this publication, Vancouver CC910548. 
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4. Disclosure will give guidance to the criminal element in our society on how to commit 
their nefarious offenses with impunity. 
· 5. Disclosure of this kind will 0stifle internally and externally the exchange of information 
or assistance as information rendered will be compromised. 
Defence counsel argued that without the details of the communication between the Crown 
lawyers and police, his clients will be deprived of giving full answers and defence to the 
allegations against them. He submitted that · disclosure will establish that the circumvention of 
the legal system was an objective as was the seizure of $750,000.00; the police were given 
assurances that they would not be prosecuted; and the evidence will show that there is an abuse 
of the process of the court on account of entrapment. The accused's rights under section 7, 8 
and 9 had been infringed and that should result in a judicial stay of proceedings under s. 24 (1) 
of the Charter or the evidence should be excluded under s. 24 (2) as admission would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. 
The Supreme Court of BC rejected the RCMP application and the Crown explored with •ms 
Lordship" how this disclosure should be handled. Did he want the lawyer in Chambers to 
describe the advice he gave police; did he want a written report that he could edit? The Justice 
held that the lawyer should be treated as an ordinary witness and testify and the Crown could 
raise objections if it saw fit to do so. Any kind of in camera proceedings was rejected. 
The Crown then appealed the rejection of the application by the staff officer under s. 37 of the 
Canada Evidence Act, to the BC Court of Appeal. 
Section 37 C.E.A. provides that anyone interested may object to disclosure of information on 
the grounds of a specific public interest. This objection may be raised by certifying orally or 
in writing to any body or person with jurisdiction to compel the production of information. 
Where the objection is made in a Court of superior jurisdiction as was the case here, it may hear 
the information and subject disclosure to restrictions or conditions so the public interest in 
disclosure outweighs the specific public interest raised in the objection. 
The BC Court of Appeal assumed that section 37 C.E.A. is now in place of the government's 
common law right to "Crown Privilege". It assumed that there were misconceptions about the 
order issued by the Justice of the Supreme Court. The application by the staff officer indicates 
that no disclosure of the advice police received from the lawyer should be made. The Justice 
had rejected a blanket exclusion but did not in any way prevent the Crown or Police from 
lodging objections under s. 37 C.E.A. while the lawyer or investigating officers testified. Not 
5 
knowing what the Justice would allow or exclude there was nothing for the Court of Appeal to 
review. The process intended by the Justice was appropriate and the law does not provide for 
a "blanket" clamp on sensitive disclosures. 
Objection · to disclosure 
dismissed 
Note: The decision that no lawyer - client relationship exists between Crown Counsel and 
Police was not included in this appeal. 
6 
ARMED ROBBERY AND THE USE OF A 
FIREARM IN THE COMMISSION OF AN 
INDICTABLE OFFENCE 
REGINA v. FITZWILLIAMS - Quebec Court of Appeal, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 81. 
The accused and four companions arrived at a shopping centre in two cars. They were arrested 
instantly "for about to commit an armed robbery". Police found a revolver and a machine gun 
with clip in one ear. The car in which the accused arrived was clean. 
The accused was convicted of •using a firearm while attempting to commit an indictable 
offence" (s. 85 C.C.). He appealed this conviction to the Court of Appeal for Quebec, based 
on decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
A party by the name of McGuigan8 had used a loaded shotgun to rob a shopkeeper. He had 
been convicted of armed robbery as well as using a firearm while committing that robbery. He 
argued before the Supreme Court of Canada that his use of the loaded shotgun was part of the 
armed robbery and that the dual conviction did violate the principle that no one should be 
convicted of more than one offence arising from one delict, particularly where the offenses 
overlap one another. 9 This pre-Charter response by the Supreme Court of Canada was that 
Parliament had enacted s. 85 C.C. to curb the menace of the use of firearms. Consequently 
when the weapon used in an armed robbery is a firearm the additional conviction and 
consecutive sentence are appropriate. 
In October 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada gave reasons for judgement in Regina v. 
Krug. 10 He had, like McGuigan, questioned the validity of the additional conviction and 
sentence. The only difference was that Krug could argue that the provisions contained in s. 85 
C.C. violated his right under s. 7 of the Charter. Krug's car had been repossessed by the Bank 
and had been stored in a secured compound. Aiming a rifle at the security. guard, Krug had 
demanded that he be allowed to take his car. Police had disarmed him and Krug was, among 
others, convicted of attempted armed robbery and the use of a firearm while committing that 
offence. 
8 McGuigan v. The Queen (1982) 66 C.C.C. (2d) 97, Volume 5, page 25 of this 
publication. 
9 Kienapple v. The Queen (1974) 15 C.C.C. (2d) 524 - For Explanation of this 
principle see page nn of this volume (Regina v. Crabe). 
10 Regina v. Krug 91985) 21 C.C.C. (3d) 193, Volume 22, page 2 of this publication. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the. arguments and explained that if one commits theft 
while armed to overcome the real or anticipated resistance .of the possessor of the property, then 
one commits robbery. The weapon, however, does not need to be a firearm. Therefore the 
offence created by s. 85 C.C. is separate and distinct from armed robbery as the use of a 
firearm is an additional essential element to what needs to be proved. The dual convictions for 
attempted robbery and using a firearm in the commission of that indictable offence were not 
violating either the Kienapple principle nor any charter right. . (See footnote re: outcome of 
Krug's appeal). 
The Supreme Court of Canada did in both cases emphasize that the Crown must show that the 
actual~ of a firearm for a conviction under s. '85 C.C. The trial judge in this Fitzwilliams 
case had held that the word "use" includes: · •tc) carry, to have at hand loaded firearms for the 
purpose of committing a robbery". Equipping oneself with a firearm and carrying it when 
committing robbery, ready to be used, is included in the "use" intended under s. 85 C.C. held 
the trial judge. "It is not necessary for the firearm to have been used, he had held. 
The Quebec Court of Appeal held that in the circumstances as they were at the scene it could 
not be said that the accused had "used" a firearm. It rejected for technical reasons, to consider 
if the accused had "attempted to use a firearm while attempting to commit an indictable 
offence". The Court was not convinced "that all the factual conclusions necessary to justify the 
conviction were drawn by the trial judge". 
Accused's appeal allowed 
Conviction quashed 
Note: Krug had also been convicted of pointing a firearm at the security guard. In view of the 
conviction under s. 85 C.C. for the"use" of a firearm, the conviction for "pointing" 
could not stand. With regard to that offence the "pointing" and the "use" were 
synonymous. 
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CHARTER CHALLENGE FOR UNREASONABLE SEARCH 
OR SEIZURE IN REGARD TO TAKING BREATH FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF ANALYSIS 
REGINA v. BASSI ;;. Supreme Court of BC, Vancouver CC920567 
The accused was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident. The investigating officer 
observed the usual symptoms of impairment. .In the rear seat of the police car he demanded a 
sample of breath for the roadside screening device . . As the accused failed that test and after 
having observed him staggering as he escorted the accused to another police veliiele, he made 
the demand for a breathalyzer test. The accused was convicted of •over 80 milligrams• and 
appealed that conviction to the BC Supreme Court claiming, among other things, that the officer 
had lacked the requisite grounds to make the breathalyzer demand. Consequently the analysis 
amounted to an unreasonable search and the certificate should have been excluded from 
evidence. 
This approach is unique as in most cases the certificate evidence is attacked on the basis that the 
demand was not made pursuant to s. 254 (3) C.C. and therefore the certificate is not evidence 
of the facts contained in that document and the certified results of the analysis is not proof of 
the accused's blood-alcohol content at the time of driving. This usually leaves it open for the 
crown to adduce the evidence of the analysis without the certificate or the presumption of 
equalization. However, claiming that a demand not based on reasonable and ·probable grounds 
causes compliance with that demand to be an infringement of the accused's right to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure may, if the claim is successful, cause the evidence to be 
inadmissible regardless how adduced. 
The foundation to show that there was no reasonable and probable grounds for making the 
breathalyzer demand, was laid through cross-examination of the officer. The roadside device 
is vulnerable to interference causing false readings if used around electronic transmitters. The 
officer had not turned off his portable radio or the radio in the police car. Neither had he 
performed two procedures to test the accuracy the device. 
The Supreme Court reminded defence counsel that since the evidence was attacked by means of 
a Charter route the burden was on the defence to prove on the balance of probabilities that the 
accused's rights were infringed and not on the Crown to show the absence of such 
infringements. The defence had failed to meet that burden of proof. The evidenee showed that 
the officer had genuine belief (objectively and subjectively) that the accused's ability to drive 
was impaired by alcohol. That and his awareness of all circumstances had given him the 
grounds requisite to the demand. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction Upheld 
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CONCEALMENT OF EVIDENCE. OBSTRUCTING A 
PEACE OFFICER IN THE LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF i>VTY 
REGINA v. LA VIN - Quebec Court of Appeal, 76 C.C.C. (3d) 279, August 1992. 
The Quebec Highway Safety Code provides that no one may operate a motor vehicle containing 
a radar warning device. A police officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that there is 
such a device in a motor vehicle may "inspect" the vehicle and confiscate the device. 
Contravention of any of these provisions constitutes an offence. 
In this case a police officer saw a wire hanging from the accused's sun visor. He drove up 
behind him and activated equipment to stop the accused. The accused removed the detector 
from the sun-visor and placed it in his pocket. The officer clearly saw this and made the 
accused aware of his right to confiscate the device and demanded him to hand it over. The 
accused consulted his lawyer and then told the offieer he did not have such a device and invited 
him to search the car. They debated the issue whether the officer had the authority to search 
the accused's person. The officer warned that failure to hand over the device amounted to 
obstructing him in the lawful performance of his duty. As this was . to no avail an arrest for that 
criminal offence was effected. The accused .apparently knowing that the officer now had a right 
to search his person, incident to the arrest, handed the device over. The accused was convicted 
and had appealed to no avail to the summary conviction appeal court. He then appealed to the 
Quebec Court of Appeal. 
The Quebec Court of Appeal reviewed numerous "obstruction" cases and found none of great 
assistance. The Quebec traffic laws do not contain any provisions that caused the accused to be 
duty bound to hand over the device, nor was he at common law required to do so. In essence, 
the officer claimed to be obstructed as the accused failed to confess or deliver the evidence. 
Unless there is a legal duty to act, merely not doing something cannot amount to obstruction. 
For instance, one has a legal duty to identify him/herself for the purpose of commencing 
criminal proceedings against that person. [Moore v. The Queen (1978) 43 C.C.C. (2d) 83]. 
However, here was no duty "to deliver" the device. Said the Court: 
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"It seems to me that wilful obstruction requires either some 
positive act, such as concealment of evidence, or an omission to 
do something which one is legally obliged to do, and that neither 
requirement is fulfilled in this case". 
Accused appeal allowed 
Acquittal entered 
Note: This judgement was not unanimous. One Justice dissented and felt the conviction 
should stand and the appeal should be .dismissed. Originally the accused had 
assumed that the lights and siren were activated to stop a car ahead of him. 
Although he felt pretty secure, he had slipped the device in his pocket "just in 
case". When he discovered police were after him, the continuation of storing the 
device in his pocket became concealment of evidence held the dissentin& Justice; 
evidence the officer had a right to confiscate. That contiiiuation, after the 
accused knew the facts, to which he personally testified, 11He knew I had it, and 
I knew that he knew I had it1', did amount to concealment of evidence and 
obstruction. 
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ASSAULT MUST FACil..ITATE THEFT FOR THE ACT TO 
AMOUNT TO ROBBERY - AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND 
INTENT REQUIRED - ROBBERY AND AGGRA V AIED ASSAULT 
'REGINA v. CRABE - Court of Appeal for BC, Victoria V01302, February 1993. 
Late in the evening a Mr. I. parked his car at the Victoria waterfront next to a motor vehicle 
occupied by two young men (one was the accused) and two young women. Mr. I. walked to 
the end of the •breakwater• and when he returned he met the two male occupants of the car he 
had parked next to. The accused •body-checked• Mr. I. so severely that he (Mr. J.) went over 
the edge of the break-water and fell to the concrete and rock at least 10 feet down. Mr. I. laid 
there unconscious for a while. He suffered multiple fractures, contusions and lacerations. 
The accused, when he arrived back at the car, asked for the use of a metal coat hanger and 
opened Mr. J's car with it. He found an ignition key in the glove compartment and drove away 
in Mr. J's car. The next day the foursome drove the car some 500 km north of Victoria and 
disposed of it. 
The accused was convicted of robbery and aggravated assault. He appealed the convictions to 
the Court of Appeal for BC on two grounds. He argued that the assault on Mr. J. was not done 
to accommodate the theft of his car. The time that had elapsed between the assault and the theft 
was proof of that, he claimed. Furthermore, assault is an essential element of robbery. If the 
robbery conviction is appropriate in the circumstances then a separate conviction of assault is 
inappropriate. He also argued that aggravated assault calls for an intent to wound, maim, 
disfigure or endanger the life of the complainant. The accused admitted the "body-check" and 
realized that it amounts to assault. That Mr. I. went over the edge of the breakwater was not 
an intended consequence. The assault therefore was at the most "common", not •aggravated" 
and as explained above, not part of the theft of the car. In essence the accused submitted that 
convictions of common assault and theft are the only ones supported by the evidence. 
In terms of the required intent for aggravated assault the Courts of Appeal have different 
interpretations. One has held that for aggravated assault the Crown must show an intent on the 
part of the accused not simply to assault the complainant but also that maiming etc. was an 
intended consequence11 • 
11 Regina v. Parish (1990) 60 C.C.C. (3d) 350. 
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The Ontario12 and Manitoba13 Courts of Appeal disagreed and held that all three levels of 
;assault require . the ·same .criminal intent. All parliament did was increase the penalties 
· proportionate with the severity of the consequences of the assault by means of enacting common 
assault, causing bodily harm, and aggravated assault. The BC Court of Appeal agreed with their 
Ontario and Manitoba counterparts. 
In Kienapple14v. The Queen the Supreme Court of Canada held that a person should not be 
convicted of multiple offenses arising from the one delict. If two offenses are alleged, arising 
from one delict and one is included in the other, then an accused person can only be convicted 
of one of the alleged offenses. To be convicted of both would be tantamount to double 
jeopardy. However, sometimes more than one offence is alleged arising from one criminal act. 
These offenses may well be distinct and separate from one another, but do overlap. In the 
Kienapple decision the Supreme Court of Canada decided that where the accused had raped (as 
the crime then was) a female person under the age of fourteen years he should not be convicted 
of sexual intercourse with an underage female person as well as rape as the offence arose from 
one delict (one act of illicit sexual intercourse). Although the two offenses are separate and 
distinct from one another in that the one is not included in the other, all the Crown had left to 
prove after proving rape, was the age of the victim to secure a conviction for the second 
offence. The two offenses did arise from one act of illicit sexual intercourse and would, despite 
their substantial overlap, result in multiple convictions. 
In this case the defence argued that since the Court held that the assault on Mr. J. and the theft 
of his car were in time close enough that the former was committed to facilitate the latter, the 
assault was part of the robbery. Consequently the multiple convictions for robbery and 
aggravated assault are contrary to the dictum created by the Kienapple decision. 
The Court of Appeal for BC held that a common assault will suffice to prove the required 
violence associated with robbery. Aggravated assault is an assault with certain consequences. 
The charge of aggravated assault in this case was in regards to the results of the kind of assault 
that was part of the robbery. In that sense the two were separated from one another and not 
.. substantially" the same for the principle of "Kienapple overlap" to apply. The Court held 
therefore that the multiple convictions were not inappropriate. 
12 Regina v. Leclerc (1991) 67 C.C.C. (3d) 563. 
13 Regina v. Scharf (1988) 42 C.C.C. (3d) 378. 
14 Kienapple v. The Queen (1974) 15 C.C.C. (2d) 524. 
Convictions were upheld 
Accused's appeal was dismissed 
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NARCOTIC CONTROL ACT - WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF CAR ON 
PRIVATE PROPERTY - REASONABLENESS OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
REGINA v. ZASTOWNY - Court of Appeal for BC, 76 C.C.C. (3d) 492. 
Warrantless searches, particularly those conducted on private property, have not met with 
.success in terms of having the results admitted into evidence. Many were, despite the statutory 
provisions authorizing the search, held to be "unreasonable" as meant bys. 8 of the Charter. 
A warrantless search or seizure is by its very nature unreasonable unless the Crown proves 
otherwise. 
In this case, a police officer received information from a proven reliable source, that the accused 
sold narcotics and details on how he conducted his business. The former was not news to the 
officer while the latter was interesting and helpful. The accused was a known drug trafficker. 
For the next couple of days the accused was placed under surveillance and he was seen to meet 
with individuals who were well known in the drug trade. 
The accused was seen to place a brown paper bag in the trunk of a Lincoln parked in the 
driveway of a private residence. He shortly after left in another car. While other officers 
followed the accused, the investigating officer entered the private property and opened the trunk 
of the Lincoln by means of the trunk release button inside the unlocked car. There was only one 
brown paper bag in the trunk and it contained quantities of cocaine and marihuana. Despite the 
reasonable grounds the officers searched without a warrant. 
Approximately an hour after this search the accused was stopped by the officers who shadowed 
him. He was arrested for what was found in the Lincoln. He had a considerable amount of 
cash on his person, and a key to the Lincoln and baggies of the same kind in which the cocaine 
was found. 
The accused was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking under the Narcotics 
Control Act and appealed from the convictions to the Court of Appeal for BC. His grounds of 
appeal were: 
1. The evidence found in the trunk of the Lincoln was the result of a warrantless search on 
private property. The search and seizure were unreasonable and contrary to s . . 8 of the 
Charter; 
2. That the observations of the investigating officer of the accused placing "a" brown paper 
bag in the trunk of the Lincoln was inconclusive to prove that what was found was the 
very bag the accused was seen to place in the trunk. 
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The latter ground was argued on the basis that there were also in the trunk two plastic bags 
·containing household garbage. Police had not searched the content of these bags and the officer 
could therefore, in his evidence, not eliminate the possibility that the brown paper bag the 
accused carried, was not placed in the garbage bags. Also, there was no proof that the accused 
knew what the bag contained. The trial judge had found as a fact that the bag the accused 
carried and the one found in · the trunk besides the garbage bags, were one and the same. There 
had also been evidence of a strong smell of marihuana coming from the bag. The trial judge 
had from this deduced that the accused was aware of the content. The BC Court of Appeal 
seemed to have accepted those facts as it hardly referred to these issues. 
The main issue was the reasonableness of the search. In view of the fact that the search was 
warrantless the Crown had to show that the search did not infringe the accused's right to be 
secure against unreasonable search or seizure (s. 8 Charter). 15 
Due to one decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in 199016 and another by the Court of 
Appeal for BC in 199117 there seems to be a consensus that the threshold of the assumed 
unreasonableness where a search was warrantless is insurmountable where there was time to 
obtain a warrant, unless it is a search or seizure incident to an arrest. Even then, the search is 
limited to the detainee's person and immediate surroundings. Furthermore, lawfulness and 
reasonableness of a search or seizure are not necessarily synonymous. 
The trial judge had held that the 1990 and 1991 decisions were not applicable to this case. In 
the 1990 decision police had searched to gain the reasonable grounds required to conduct a 
search under the Narcotic Control Act. 
In 1991 decision the search was of a car in relation to stolen property. There simply was no 
provision for a warrantless search. 
In this case the search was carried out in compliance with the provisions of the Narcotic Control 
Act. The car and the place where it was parked, were places where police are empowered to 
search without warrant provided they have the requisite reasonable and probable grounds. 
is Hunter v. Southam Inc. [1984] 2 S.C.R. - Volume 18, page 12 of this publication. 
16 Regina v. Kokesch 61 C.C.C. (3d) 207 - Volume 39, page 6 of this publication. 
17 Regina v. Klimchuk - Volume 40, page 6 of this publication. 
15 
The BC Court of Appeal held that objectively as well as subjectively the investigating officer .. . 
·bad those required grounds to search the trunk of the Lincoln car. The Crown need not 
demonstrate anything else. The search was therefore lawful and in the circumstances reasonable. 
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The accused •s appeal ·was 
dismissed. Conviction 
·upheld. 
IS "SICKING" A DOG TO ATTACK A PERSON 
ASSAULT USING A WEAPON? 
REGINA v. McLEOD - Court of Appeal for the Yukon Territories, Whitehorse, YU00214 
The accused ordered her pit bull terrier to "sic" the complainant who, as a consequence, suffered 
injuries to her hand. She was acquitted of assault using a weapon. The sole question in the 
Crown's appeal was whether or not in the circumstances a dog can be a weapon. 
The trial judged had held that an animate object is not included in the Criminal Code's definition 
of weapon. · The Court of Appeal, however, read down the offence section as well as the 
definition of weapon and held that the operative words are: 
"Everyone who, in committing an assault ..... uses .... a weapon .... is guilty of an 
indictable offence", and "Weapon means anything used ..... in causing injury or 
death to persons ...... " (emphasis is mine). 
The Court held that "anything" in this context to include animate and inanimate bodies. 
Accordingly a dog can be used as a weapon. 
Crown's appeal allowed 
Accused convicted 
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CAN A RECANTED PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT FROM 
.A WITNESS BE EVIDENCE OF THE TRUTH OF ITS CONTENT? .· 
REGINA v. K.B.G. - Supreme Court of Canada, 70 (3d) 257, February 1993. 
Four youths, including the accused, were involved· in a -.fight -with -two -brothers. --One -of the 
brothers was stabbed and died. Three of the youths gave statements to police to the effect that 
the accused had told them that he was :the one who llad .done the,stabbing. 
At the accused's trial for second degree murder the three youths agreed that they had made the 
statement about the accused's admission to them but testified that they had lied. As provided 
for in the Canada Evidence Act the witnesses were cross-examined by the party that called them, 
but they did not vary from their version of things. This left the trial judge to apply the very 
rigid rule that an unadopted prior inconsistent statement can only be used with respect to the 
credibility of the witness but not to prove the truth of its content. Consequently the statements 
were not evidence to identify the accused as the one who had stabbed the deceased. An acquittal 
resulted and the Crown's appeal reached the Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.) 
The S.C.C., in essence, held that the rule accurately applied by the trial judge, was overly rigid 
and technical and in need of reform. Needless to say, a reform with the Charter of Rights and 
Freedom in mind. 
The statements the youths made to police, were not made under oath while their testimony 
recanting the statements was. The witnesses could not individually vouch for the truth of the 
content of what the accused had told them and hence the statements would have been hearsay 
evidence if the witnesses had followed through with their testimony. Furthermore, the jury only 
observed the witnesses in the witness box but did not have the benefit of having observed the 
witness' demeanour while they gave the recanted statements to police. This forced them to 
either believe the prior statement or the testimony. These are some of the reasons for the rule 
of evidence the trial judged had applied and which was labelled as "orthodox" by the S.C.C. 
To overcome the difficulty in asking a jury to believe an unswom statement over sworn 
.. ··~ testimony the S.C.C. held that-this was best done -by having the witness make the statement 
under oath, warn them about the criminal liability should they lie and videotape the giving of 
the statement. This could remove the reasons for the "orthodox" rule the trial judge had been 
bound to apply. 
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Apparently, to avoid unnecessary rigidity in the .modified rulecthe .S.C.C . .hastened to add that 
the oath, warning .and . videotaping were the -ideal ;means of.showing-Jeliability but .not the .. only 
means. Witnesses who observed the taking and making of the statement, can in exceptional 
circumstances, provide the reliability factor required for the truth of its contents. 
In other words a prior inconsistent statement can be admissible to show the truth of its content 
despite the fact that the person who gave the statement testifies that it was not the truth. A voir 
dire must be held to determine if the statement is reliable. 
In this case the giving of the statement was video taped and it could be used to deal with the 
reliability of the statement. Furthermore, the application of the rigid rule had prevented an 
exploration if there was sufficient substitute for the "oath and warning" proposed as part of the 
modified rule. 
Crown's api>eal allowed 
New trial ordered 
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CROSS-EXAMINATION ON SELECTIVE MEMORY 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR TRAFFICKING BY 
MEANS QF AIDING 
,. REGINA v. MORGAN - Court of Appeal for Ontario, 80 C.C.C. (3d) 16 
The accused aided in the sale of cocaine to · an undercover police officer. A police agent 
involved in the transaction gave police statements as the investigation was ongoing. These video 
taped statements were used by police to _prepare a •will say• statement for the agent. Prior to 
testifying at the preliminary hearing the agent refreshed his memory from that "will say" 
statement. For the purpose of the testimony at trial the agent refreshed his memory from the 
transcript of the preliminary hearing. Defence counsel sought to cross-examine the agent 
whether his memory had been selectively refreshed by police. As the agent had not personally 
prepared the document fundamental to his testimony, the trial judge had limited the cross-
examination to issues of credibility. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that whether or not a witness has personally prepared the 
document from which he/she refreshed his/her memory, the defence is permitted to cross-
examine on the issue of selective memory. 
The trial judge had instructed the jury on whether or not the accused was an "aider" as defined 
in the Criminal Code. This, the Court of Appeal held, was inadequate. The jury should have 
been given the specific direction that the accused was only criminally liable for his role in the 
transaction if they found he had aided the seller. 
Accused's appeal allowed 
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CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF "DURESS" 
·~ · :·' PRISON WORKER SMUGGLING DRUGS INTO CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE 
REGINA v. LANGLOIS - Court of Appeal for Quebec, 80 C.C.C. (3d) 28, February, 1993. 
A prison employee·was found to smuggle drugs into the correctional institute. He· was charged 
with conspiracy and trafficking in narcotics and drugs. At his trial the accused raised the defence 
of duress. He had brought the drugs into the institute as failure to do so would have jeopardized 
the safety of his wife and children. He received instructions where to collect the drugs and 
when to bring them, by means of anonymous phone calls. He had also received instructions 
directly from inmates. 
The defence of duress, as it is defined in the Criminal Code, is only available where the offence 
is committed "under compulsion by threats of immediate death or bodily harm from a person 
who is present when the offence is committed". This defence as defined was obviously not 
available to the accused. However, the trial judge held that there was a common law defence 
of duress that was more generous to the accused. An acquittal followed. The Crown appealed 
to the Court of Appeal for Quebec and reasoned that statute law supersedes common law. 
The Court of Appeal in essence revived the common law defence of duress by ruling that the 
Criminal Code definition of the defence violates the fundamental principles of justice in that it 
deprives a person of a defence where he is morally blameless due to having committed the 
wrongful act "normatively involuntary". 
The Court declined to alter the Criminal Code section by interpretation. Compulsion renders 
a person blameless in many circumstances. Yet the section deprives a person of that defence 
in the gravest crimes as it does not include death or bodily harm threatened to be inflicted on 
family members or other loved ones. In terms of the prerequisite mental state· on the part of the 
person who commits the act, the Criminal Code definition is irreparable. 
The defence the accused raised had with regard to some aspects of events an air of reality. 
Other circumstances however made the accused more than a person acting exclusively from fear. 
The defence (the common law version) was left with the jury and it returned a verdict of not 
guilty. 
Considering the Quebec Court of Appeal opinion that the statutory definition of the defence of 
duress is unconstitutional,it declined to intervene. 
Crown's appeal dismissed 
Acquittal upheld 
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Facts: 
When the accused was searched as well as his pick-up truck, over 3500 valium pills, 282.6 
grams of .hashish and .cash .money was found. In addition, letters, ,tapes .and clothing-for 
member,s of Hell's Angels gang were seized from the accused. He, at the time, admitted to 
.having smuggled approximately ·s-.pieces" of hashish.into the jail.about IO.days.before. . . 
There was also evidence that the accused had sold 3623 valium -pills. Seven -charges··. were 
preferred. A jury returned a verdict of not guilty when told by the trial judge that morally the 
accused had not committed any of the offenses if what he did was done involuntary due to 
duress. If the claim of duress created a reasonable doubt it had to be resolved in favour of the 
accused. 
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ARBITRARY DETENTION BY OFFICER STOPPING CAR 
.SEEN BEFORE AT SUSPECTED "CRACK HOUSE" 
REGINA v. SIMPSON .- Ontario Court of Appeal, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482. 
A memo was circulated in the police department by an officer who had in a "street contact" been 
informed that at a certain address drugs were.sold . . Another officer .noticed a car at this address 
and he pulled it over after it left the premises. He wanted to see what story the two occupants 
of the car would give him and if they ·would trip themselves up and give him grounds to arrest 
them. As the officer questioned them about their activities he noticed a bulge in the accused's 
pocket and made him take out the object that caused the bulge. It was a baggie containing 
cocaine. He was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking. He appealed this 
verdict on the basis that this evidence had been obtained by a means that violated his rights 
under the Charter. He said he was arbitrarily detained when the evidence was discovered. 
The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the reasons the officer gave . for the stopping of the 
vehicle (in which the accused was a passenger) left him without authorization for it under the 
Narcotic Control Act or the Highway Traffic Act. Under the latter Act the random stopping is 
authorized for promoting safe use of motor vehicles. There was nothing included in the officer's 
reasons for the stop that was relevant to this objective. The Narcotic Control Act does not 
provide for random stopping either, although the search and seizure provisions do include the 
stopping of vehicles where there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe that narcotics 
are transported. The officer in this case was at best on a fishing expedition and did not have 
sufficient knowledge about the content of the memo or its validity factor to hold that he had 
"corporate knowledge". 
As the statutes were of no assistance to the Crown's interest the Court turned to common law. 
Police have wide duties to prevent and ferret out crime. When criminal activities are suspe.cted 
police have a duty to make efforts to substantiate police intelligence. If this was the officer's 
objective, he had been in the execution of his duty. However, the lawfulness of the conduct on 
the part of the police, depends on the justifiable use of power associated with that duty. 
Police must have an articuable cause for detaining a person in circumstances like these. There 
simply must be a gathering of "objectively discernible facts "that give the police reasonable 
cause to suspect that a person is implicated in the criminal activity under investigation. In the 
absence of such articuable cause, police have no power to interfere with a person's "fundamental 
liberty to move about in society" to the extent as they did in this case. The Court recognized 
that experienced police personnel have hunches that are not too often wrong. However, if they 
act on a hunch and it proves to be accurate, that will not suffice to serve as grounds for 
interference or exercise of authority 
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When the officer pulled the car over he, by his own candid testimony, had no more than . a .... 
hunch. The detention that followed was .arbitrary and the cocaine had been searched . for and 
seized while he was so detained . . The .cocaine was inadmissible .as evidence. 
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Accused's appeal allowed, 
conviction set aside, acquittal 
substituted. 
POLICE FAILING TO INQUIRE INTO RELIABILITY 
OF INFORMER'S TIP-RESULTED IN WARRANTLESS 
SEARCH TO BE UNREASONABLE 
REGINA v. LAMY - Manitoba Court of Appeal, 80 C.C.C. (3d) 558, April 1993. 
Police received information from a .source they considered . ,reliable, .,that .. the .accused was 
associated with his brother in trafficking narcotics, and that he was on his way home with a 
quantity of marihuana in his car. The brother was well known to police but the accused was 
not. Motor vehicle records were checked and the description of the accused's car was obtained. 
The brother's and the accused's home were kept under surveillance and the roads leading into 
the town were checked. The accused's car was spotted and a warrantless search of the vehicle 
produced sufficient results to charge the accused with possession (of a large quantity) of 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking. 
The trial judge had found that the search and seizure had been unreasonable under s. 8 of the 
Charter. The evidence was excluded and the accused was acquitted. 
The Crown appealed claiming that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to believe the 
accused was in possession of marihuana. Furthermore, a warrantless search upon such grounds 
is authorized for any place except a dwelling house. (s. 10 Narcotic Control Act). 
Consequently the search was lawful and reasonable and the evidence should not have been 
excluded. Furthermore, even if the search was unreasonable, the evidence found was real and 
the administration of justice would not have been brought into disrepute had the evidence been 
admitted. 
Some of the pertinent facts and law are that: 
1. The accused had objected to the search. 
2. Police had done nothing to determine the source of the informer's information to satisfy 
themselves that reasonable and probable grounds did exist for them believing that the 
accused transported narcotics. 18 
3. Police felt there were insufficient grounds for them to obtain a search warrant while the 
prerequisite ground for such a warrant are the same as those required to conduct a 
warrantless search of the accused's vehicle (s. 10 N.C.A.). 
18 Regina v. Debot - See Volume 36, page 27 of this publication - [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 
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4. There is presumption in law19 that a warrantless search is unreasonable unless the 
Crown proves otherwise. 
5. Regardless of statutory provisions authorizing,warrantless searches, judicial authorization 
must be obtained where feasible, as a pre-condition to a valid search ·under s. 8 of the 
.. ... Charter which does not protect proprietary.rights but the rights to privacy where one has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
In regards to 2. above, . police did . apparently not even inquire where the informer got his 
information from. No attempt was made to corroborate the truth or reliability of the "tip". 
In regards to 3. above, the Crown maintained there were no grounds for a search -warrant but 
when police observed the accused's vehicle heading for town on the highway this changed. This 
confirmed the informer's tip sufficiently for police to have grounds for a warrantless search. 
The equalization with regard to the prerequisite grounds for a warrant and a warrantless search 
simply did not exist anymore. To obtain a warrant when the accused's vehicle was spotted was 
simply impractical. All cases indicate that where statute authorizes a warrantless search the 
failure to obtain a warrant due to urgency or impracticality removes the presumption of 
unreasonableness. 
The Manitoba Court of Appeal was not persuaded. It in essence said, that the failure of police 
to inquire into the reliability of the tip they received deprived the accused· from having the 
grounds for searching his vehicle judicially scrutinized beforehand. Police had interfered with 
his rights to privacy on the scantiest of grounds. They did perhaps have the grounds when the 
vehicle was spotted but that was in the circumstances due to that failure to verify, not sufficient 
to overcome the presumed unreasonableness. 
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Crown's appeal dismissed, 
Acquittal upheld. 
19 Hunter v. Southam (1984) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 Also see Volume 18, page 12 of this 
publication. 
OFFICERS ENTERING PRIVATE PROPERTY TO INVESTIGATE 
REPORT OF IMPAIRED DRIVING - PROPRIETY OF ACTIONS 
. - TRESPASS AND SEARCH 
REGINA v. JOHNSON - BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo No. 263605. 
-, .. , ;-,~A citizen .observed a . car.being "driven .erratically .and .reported .this .to ·the .police ... A ..  constable 
was given the details and was told to investigate. The officer and his partner attended at the 
address of the registered owner. To get to the house they had to drive up a 700 metre driveway 
from which the house was visible for the last 25 metres. The car they were looking for was 
parked near the house. The engine was running and the accused was behind the wheel. She was 
drinking beer and her female passengers were having some wine. 
The accused showed obvious symptoms of impairment. She refused to comply with the demand 
for breath samples and consequently an Appearance Notice was issued for •refusal" and 
"impaired driving". She was convicted and appealed these verdicts to the BC Supreme Court 
claiming that the officers had trespassed and that they had gained the evidence of her impairment 
by means of a warrantless search. This search was consequently unreasonable not only because 
of the officers actions but by the very nature of such a search. 
The BC Supreme Court rejected the arguments and held that the evidence had been obtained 
lawfully and without any infringement of the accused's Charter rights. The officers were clearly 
in the lawful execution of their duty. They received a complaint with respect to the commission 
of a criminal offence and were obliged to investigate to ascertain the author of that crime. This 
included approaching the known owner of the car to discover who was driving it at the time the 
offence was committed. Needless to say, one can only obtain a search warrant for "things" but 
not for persons. 
It so happened, that the owner was found to have the care and control of the car while her 
ability was impaired by alcohol. 
Appeal dismissed 
Convictions upheld 
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EVIDENCE OF ROADSIDE SCREENING DEVICE TEST TO 
PROVE IMPAIRED DRIVING - RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
REGINA v. ANDERSEN - BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo 258145, January 1993. 
The accused was involved in a motor vehicle accident. · ·He and his passenger were injured . . At 
,the scene .the. investigating officer detected a strong smell of an alcoholic. beverage on the 
accused's breath. Due to the injuries no other symptoms of impairment were observed. 
The hospital staff indicated that they also were of the opinion that the accused had been drinking 
excessively and agreed that a demand for a screening device test was justified. This resulted in 
a "fail" reading. 
The trial judge held that the aggregate of the evidence was proof that the accused drove while 
his ability to do so was impaired by alcohol. This included: 1. the circumstances of the 
accident; 2. the accused's drinking pattern of that day; 3. his speeding; and failing the screening 
device test nearly one hour after the accident. · 
Needless to say, the breath test was a major portion of the evidence. The accused appealing his 
conviction, argued that the results of the screening device test were inadmissible in evidence. 
He submitted that his right to counsel had been infringed. 20 The Supreme Court of Canada 
held in 1988 that the right to counsel warning need not to be given when a roadside screening 
device test is demanded. However this demand must be made upon finding a person operating 
a motor vehicle and it then must be complied with forthwith. For instance, where a device is 
not available at the scene and needs to be delivered makes "forthwith" compliance with that law 
impossible for the suspect. If the demand is delayed to deliver a device to the scene, the suspect 
is detained beyond the operational intent of the legislation and he must be made aware of his/her 
right to counsel. 
In this case the accused was not informed of his right to counsel. This the Court held, was 
within the precedent set by the Supreme Court of Canada. The demand was made as soon as 
... -practicable . .. Jt could not have been made any earlier.due to circumstances at the scene of the 
accident. The compliance was forthwith and consequently the right to counsel warning needed 
not to be given. 
20
· Regina v. Davidson - See Volume 41 page 19 of this publication. 
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The screening device is designed to ascertain the presence of alcohol in · the blood of a person, 
and no more than that. Yet the trialjudge had attached considerable weight to the •fail". reading 
to conclude that the accused's ability to operate a ·motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, argued 
the accused. 
The Supreme Court Justice disagreed and found that the "fail" result was no more than the 
noting of facts in the trial judge's decision. He had not erred and there was no excessive weight 
attached to that evidence. 
Appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
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CREA TING A DISTURBANCE AS A CRIMINAL OFFENCE: 
THE MEANING OF "SHOUTING" 
REGINA v. REED - Court of Appeal for BC, Victoria V01398 
The accused was once a Jehovah Witness and had been expelled ·from the ·Assembly. ·He does, 
however, attend the movement's conventions and·usually annoys those in attendance with views 
quite contrary to the doctrines of.their beliefs. He professes these views by means of an electric 
megaphone with considerable volume. Often his means of communication come to the attention 
of the Courts21 as they result in the Crown alleging violations of by-laws or offences under the 
Criminal Code of Canada. The accused, by representing himself most of the time, has a 
remarkable track-record of acquittal. 
This time the accused had attended a convention of Jehovah Witnesses and annoyed any persons 
within 200 yards of him as he reached them via amplified sounds with insulting comments about 
their religious convictions. The sound volume was such that a normal conversation within the 
200 yards was nearly impossible. The accused was convicted of creating a disturbance in a 
public place by shouting. When his appeal to the BC Supreme Court failed he appealed further 
to the Court of Appeal for BC. 
Two questions were directed to this Court: 
1. Does the meaning of "shouting" include a electronically magnified voice, and 
2. Do sections 171 and 172 of the Criminal Code violate the freedom of religion and 
expression? In other words was the accused's freedom inhibited by him having to 
comply with sections 171 and 172 in these circumstances? 
The reasons for judgment by each of the three justices do little to shed a clear light on these 
issues for those who must enforce the sections of the Criminal Code required to maintain public 
peace. 
The Chief Justice held that for the purpose of defining ~.shouting" under the Criminal Code (not 
necessarily for the purposes in anti-noise by-laws) it does nQ1 include speaking with the aid of 
an electric amplification device. As the accused spoke in his ordinary speaking voice into his 
bull horn, he was not "shouti11g" regardless of the volume at which that voice was broadcast. 
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21 See (1) Volume 16, Page 1 of this publication, (2) (1984) 10 C.C.C. (3d) 537 (3) (1983) 
8 c.c.c. (3d) 153. 
The concurring justice (in terms of final conclusion only) felt that she was bound by the answer 
this Court gave when the accused asked the very same question about the meaning of "shouting" 
when he appealed a conviction of disturbing a religious worship by "shouting" in 1984. This 
Court then held that amplifying one's voice to a level equal to :or greater than ,that of a shouting 
., . -human voice is shouting. Consequently she held that the accuse.ct had been. shouting. 
The dissenting justice also found that the amplified voice of the -accused was "amplified 
shouting". 
The Chief Justice already having held that a normal -speaking voice amplified.by a-bull horn is 
not "shouting", also found that no disturbance had been caused. The people may not have liked 
the noise; may have been annoyed that normal conversation was inhibited; and may have felt 
insulted or offended by what was said. Loudspeakers in public places often inhibit or interrupt 
conversations and what is said may well be met with disapproval by many recipients of the 
message. However, this does not present the element of disorder that underlies the crime of 
creating a disturbance. Consequently the Chief Justice would allow the appeal. He did not 
address the issues the accused raised in question #2. 
The concurring justice, already having held that the accused was shouting quite reluctantly found 
that no public disturbance had been caused by that shouting. She, considering the standards of 
Criminal law, found that the Courts cannot convict a person of creating a disturbance if he sang 
or shouted language that inherently would disturb reasonable persons. Inherent disturbance is 
not a crime unless the Crown shows that people were in fact disturbed. However, she did not 
believe ·that if those who are insulted, offended and disturbed, merely take it and walk away, 
that there is then no disturbance. She did hold, that the precedent22 clearly states that a 
criminal disturbance must be present and manifest itself externally. As there was no evidence 
that the conduct of the accused actually did affect or disturb anyone she also allowed the appeal. 
Question #2 was not answered in her reasons for judgment. 
The dissenting justice already having held that the accused had been shouting, also found that 
a disturbance had been caused. The shouting had infringed upon "that particular crowd of 
citizens" who had a right to peace and tranquillity and had obviously disturbed them considering 
all the evidence. 
With regard to Question #2, the dissenting justice held that the impugn~ sections of the 
Criminal Code do not inhibit the accused from freely expressing or holding his beliefs. The 
section only restricts the manner in which he could exercise those freedoms. Freedoms, as 
opposed to rights, are more restricted and regulated for the sake of public order rather than to 
interfere with exercising them. There is simply nothing in the section that is an indirect attempt 
22
· Regina v. Lohnes [1992] 1 S.C.R. 167 
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to inhibit anyone from freely expressing his religious beliefs and relevant opinions. The 
dissenting justice would have dismissed the accused's appeal. 
Consequently it was the majority decision that, 
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The Appeal is allowed, and 
the conviction set aside 
POWERS OF ARREST - SPATIAL JURISDICTION. 
·POLICE IN HOT PURSUIT EFFECT ARREST IN ACCUSED'S 
BEDROOM FOR PROVINCIAL TRAFFIC OFFENCE -
EXCEPTIONS TO "CASTLE" PRINCIPLE 
REGINA v. MACOOH - {1993] 2 S.C.R. 802 - February 
.Jn early morning hours the officer saw the accused driving through a stop sign. Activation of 
the lights on the police car resulted in the accused speeding up and driving through another two 
stop signs. He parked his car at the apartment building he lived in and ran to the entrance. 
The officer who knew the accused by name, called out to him to stop, as he, the "police", 
wanted to talk to him. This was to no avail. The accused entered the building as did the 
officer, constantly calling out and identifying himself. The accused went into his apartment and 
the officer called out in front of the door, to anyone inside, that he was "police" and was going 
to enter the dwelling. As he did, the officer heard a male voice whisper in the bedroom, saying,. 
•Tell him I was here all night with you". A female voice answered, "No Doug". The officer 
entered the bedroom and arrested the accused for the arrestable offence under the Alberta 
Highway Traffic Act of failing to stop for a uniformed police officer. The accused refused to 
accompany the officer and a scuffle ensued during which the officer discovered that the accused 
was intoxicated. He then arrested the accused for impaired driving and demanded he accompany 
him for the purpose of breath analysis. 
The trial judge held that although there are binding precedents rendering it lawful for officers 
to enter private homes to effect a lawful arrest, it was not lawful in these circumstances. The 
precedents in essence established that a home is not a haven to shield those who are subject to 
lawful arrest. Lawful arrests with or without warrant, know no barriers of privacy. All these 
cases, however, involved arrests for criminal offences while this was a violation of a regulatory 
type of law enacted by a provincial government and as such, an offence punishable on summary 
conviction only. Needless to say, the lawfulness of this arrest was a kernel issue during the 
accused's trial for (1) impaired driving; (2) refusing to give samples of breath; (3) failing to stop 
for an uniformed police officer; and (4) assaulting a peace officer with the intent to resist arrest. 
The trial judge had found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to effect the 
arrest. However, his uninvited presence in the accused's home, in these circumstances, rendered 
the arrest for impaired driving unlawful. The reasonable and probable grounds for that offence 
were discovered when the officer was in hot pursuit of the accused in relation to a provincial 
summary conviction offence, albeit an arrestable offence. The precedents binding on this Court, 
were related to indictable offences only. Consequently the "Castle" or "principle of sanctity of 
home" applied. 
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The Crown successfully appealed the acquittal of the accused and he in turn, appealed to the . ., 
Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.). 
1. Eccles v. Bourque (1974) 19 C.C.C. (2d) 129. 
Police in BC forcibly trespassed by .entering .a home upon reasonable and ;probable 
grounds that a person for whom a Quebec warrant was outstanding was in the dwelling. 
Despite the fact that the person sought was not there and that police did not have the 
warrant in their possession, the ·forcible trespass was lawful at -common law. ·The 
grounds had been reasonable and probable and the officer had announced his presence 
and purpose before entry. 
2. Regina v. Landry - [1986) 1. S.C.R. 145 - Volume 8, page 22 and Volume 23, page 7 
of this publication 
A witness to an attempted car theft had followed the culprits to their home. He alerted 
police and pointed out where they. were. Police entered the home and effected arrests. 
Landry, one of the arrested persons, resisted and fought the officer. The Crown's case 
hinged on the officer having been in the lawful performance of his duty. The S.C.C. 
reiterated the exception to "the principle of sanctity of home": 
" .... there should be no place which gives an offender sanctuary 
from arrest. ... " and " .... there are occasions when the interest of 
a private individual in the private security of his house must yield 
to the public interest, when the public at large has an interest in 
the process to be executed. The criminal is not immune from 
arrest in his own home nor in the home of his friends". 
In these and other cases, it has been suggested to the S.C.C. that where police must enter by 
force to effect an arrest a warrant to arrest ought to be prerequisite to the lawfulness of the 
trespass and the arrest. The S.C.C. rejected this suggestion. The ability of police to apprehend 
an offender should not be "foiled" by the offender grabbing the horns of the alter, so to speak, 
by ducking into an apartment building. or house. The Court reviewed a number of possible 
scenarios and concluded that setting the precedent as suggested by defence counsel would create 
a legal barrier where non should exist. 
The defence also argued that the precedent established in Landry applied only where police have 
authority to arrest without warrant for the commission of an indictable offence. Consequently 
there was at the time the officer arrested the accused in his own bedroom no authority for him 
to enter a home in fresh pursuit of a person he had the power to arrest for a provincial offence. 
The S.C.C. responded that the issue in this case was not the applicability of the Landry 
precedent to a provincial offence. In La.ndry police were not in fresh pursuit. It has always 
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been common law that when in fresh pursuit, an exception to the principle of the sanctity of the 
home is triggered and police have a right to enter and effect an arrest. Consequently the only 
question the S.C.C. had to answer does this include cases of fresh pursuit where an "arrestable" 
provincial offence is involved. 
When "hot pursuit" is involved one cannot say that the offender's domestic tranquillity is 
disturbed. He went to his or a friend's home solely to escape arrest. 
"In such circumstances, the police could not be obliged to end the 
pursuit on the offender's doorstep, without making the (his) 
residence a real sanctuary .... " 
The S.C.C. reasoned that they had a responsibility in terms of public interest, not to encourage 
flight. Significant danger is involved as was demonstrated in this very case. The accused 
unnecessarily threatened the safety of those who might have been in his way. Also, flight is 
frequently undertaken not so much for escaping liability for the minor offence found committing 
but to prevent a more serious offence from being discovered. It seems in this case reasonable 
to infer that the accused was not fleeing to escape a traffic ticket but did so to avoid prosecution 
for the criminal offence of impaired driving. The results of law that would accommodate such 
flight would not in any way be in the public interest, reasoned the Court. 
The S.C.C. said that answering this question as they did, was not sufficient. Most if not all 
arrestable provincial offences have "Finding Committing" as a prerequisite to lawfulness of an 
arrest. The strictest form of finding committing, of course, is personally witnessing the 
commission of the offence. The Court found that if they applied that strict definition of finding 
committing where a provincial offence had been committed, it would fall short of the remedy 
it intended to create. Said the Court: 
"Police who arrive shortly after the offence is committed and see 
the offender fleeing should be able to follow him into private 
premises, for a provincial offence as well as for an indictable 
offence. This power of entry should also be enjoyed by police 
continuing a pursuit already begun. The requirement that there is 
really hot pursuit is ..... sufficient and is an answer to the 
concerns ...... This assumes real continuity between the commission 
of the offence and the pursuit undertaken by the police". 
Needless to say, in all of these, police must find themselves in circumstances where they are 
authorized to effect an arrest without warrant. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
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Comment: 
In these types of cases the famous •semayne's Case" of 1604, (5Co, Rep. 91) is always quoted 
as a foundation for the "a man's home is his castle" concept. The Semayne case seems to be 
:-the seed of ~the principle of the sanctity of home". The well .known passage .-0f this :case is: 
"In all cases when the King is party, the Sheriff (if the doors. be 
not open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to 
do other execution of the King's process, if otherwise he cannot 
enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his 
coming, and to make request to open doors ..... n 
In 1604 the Sheriff was indeed the King's agent. He was the executor and enforcer of anything 
within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of government and/or the Courts. The parish 
constable of that day was not an agent of the State or Crown, but a surrogate citizen. His 
business was not that of the State, although both had mutual interest in the maintenance of the 
Crown's peace and a normal state of society. Nothing has changed in regard to the distinction 
between "The Crown's Agents" and the surrogate citizen who is in charge of keeping the peace. 
We have neighbours to the south of us where the police officer is indeed the agent of the State. 
The equation of State and Police has gradually crept across the 49th parallel and has even 
infested our Courts who frequently refer to police as the State, particularly since the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms came into effect in 1982. The Charter stipulates that it applies to our 
senior levels of government and its agents and the Courts have, without consideration to the 
inherent status of police in Canada, included police in that category. Police seemed to have 
accepted this new label and may even consider it to be an elevation of status. However, this is 
a complex issue and one that hopefully will be addressed in the current inquiry into policing 
issues in British Columbia. In my view this matter is kernel to the functions of the executive 
branch's Police Services Branch and those of the Police Commission. It seems that the historical 
development of police clearly reflects the distinction between these entities. Particularly the 
function and status of the Commission was clearly envisioned at its inception in the mid 
seventies and designed to be that buffer zone between the State and the police. 
All that is intended to be said by these comments is that the Semayne case is to a certain degree 
distinct from Eccles v. Bourque and the Landry cases. In the former the King's process was 
executed in the latter the community was represented by its surrogate citizens by effecting an 
arrest of an alleged perpetrator the State may or may not, want to prosecute. 
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BLOOD SAMPLE SEIZED BY SEARCH WARRANT 
ADEQUACY OF GROUNDS 
REGINA v. STOLZ - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA015111, September 1993. 
The accused had been driving ·outrageously and was in ..several .entanglements .before he caused 
a major accident in which a woman and her child lost their lives. The accused was also injured 
and according to everyone who encountered him before or after the accident his ability to drive 
was impaired by alcohol. A hospital technician offered the investigating officer the accused's 
blood that had been taken for medical purposes. He refused to accept it without a search 
warrant. He applied for one and it was granted and executed. The accused· was convicted of 
impaired driving and appealing this verdict to the Court of Appeal for BC, he argued that the 
blood sample obtained by means of the warrant was inadmissible in evidence due to the 
document being flawed on account of a non-disclosure to the Justice of the Peace. 
The accused had first been taken to the L.M. Hospital where the blood sample was taken for 
medical purposes. It was that sample the officer seized by means of the warrant. However, the 
accused was transferred to the R.C. Hospital where, at the time the officer .applied for the 
warrant, a colleague was attempting to get the accused's permission for a sample of blood to be 
taken for the purpose of blood/alcohol analysis. This colleague was successful (the trial judge 
had admitted both samples into evidence). The defence argued that this fact should have been 
disclosed to the Justice of the Peace as well as the fact that it was feared that the blood sample 
subject to the warrant was contaminated and had been taken for medical purposes. 
The Court of Appeal rejected the argument of non-disclosure. It found the officer had acted in 
good faith all the way through. He had quite appropriately not accepted the blood sample when 
it was offered to him and had followed the process as it is provided by statute and binding 
precedents; he had no idea if his colleague would be successful; the fact that the blood was 
taken for medicinal purposes could easily be inferred by the Justice of the Peace from the 
information; and the evidence obtained was real and existed prior to the search warrant being 
obtained. The BC Court of Appeal held that there was no non-disclosure and it did not accede 
to the defence's argument. 
In view of evidence of the blood sample obtained by means of the search warrant being 
sufficient to uphold the conviction, the Court did not consider the admissibility of the blood 
sample taken in the R.C. Hospital. 
Appeal dismissed, conviction 
upheld 
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POLYGRAPH TF.ST USED AT INVESTIGATION LEVEL • 
.. WHEN ACCUSED WAS MADE AWARE OF FAILURE HE MADE AN 
.INCULPATORY STATEMENT - ADMISSIBILITY OF THE STATEMENT 
REGINA v. BARTON - 81 C.C.C. (3d) 574, Court of Appeal for Ontario 
The accused was a suspect for numerous fires largely involving homes. When there was a fire 
at his own home police accused him of having set that fire as well as 23 other fires in the district 
over a period of six years. He denied that allegation and agreed to a polygraph test. He waived 
his right to counsel. In the post-test interview the accused was informed that he had failed. The 
officer who had conducted the test and did the interview said to the accused~ "Now two of us 
know the truth 11 • The accused had hung his head and made an inculpatory statement. The 
investigators were made aware and over the following 24 hours the accused signed statements 
confessing to incidents of arson. He was constantly reminded of his right to counsel and 
informed for what purposes the statements may be used. 
Defence counsel argued that the post-test interview amounted to a psychological intrusion that 
induced an inculpatory statement. All subsequent statements were consequently similarly tainted, 
defence counsel argued. The whole procedure had gained the accused's confidence and this 
inducement rendered the statements involuntary and inadmissible. 
The Court recognized that to enhance the accuracy of the test a good relationship should exist 
between the interviewer and the person tested. This appearance of intimacy amounts to intrusion 
and does undoubtedly carry over to subsequent interviews. However, the Court also recognized 
that anyone of these features are encountered in any police interrogation. The polygraph test 
is not unique in that regard. Whether it is this~ a polygraph test or any other method of 
interviewing that was involved, the Courts must scrutinize the evidence to determine the issue 
of voluntariness. 
Defence Counsel had relied on a case decided by the Quebec Court of Appeal in 199023 and 
argued that no statement in the wake of a failed polygraph test could be voluntary for the 
purpose of admitting it in evidence to prove the truth of its content. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal in this Barton case, held that their Quebec counterpart had not 
decided that no voluntary statement was possible incident to a polygraph test. It had held that 
in that particular case the inducement had been such that the statement could not be admitted into 
evidence. Each case must be decided on its own facts. The officers had not held out any hope 
23 Regina v. Amyot - 58 C.C.C. (3d) 312. 
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of advancement or in any way .threatened the .accused. With regard .to .his right to counsel the 
accused, of his own free will, did not avail himself of legal advice while he .was made .aware of 
his rights over and over again and was offered assistance in that regard. 
Appeal from conviction 
dismissed 
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OFFICER SEARCHING ACCUSED IN HOTEL 
TOILET STALL - EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
WAS SEARCH REASONABLE? 
REGINA v. SEED - BC Supreme Court, Vancouver CC 920060, May 1993. 
Outside the washrooms of a hotel. that was notorious for drugs changing hands, was .a sign 
warning the public that the facilities were subject to random searches by police. 
During a routine "walk-through" the officer could clearly hear a snapping noise when he walked 
by the doorless ladies washroom. The officer entered and found the accused standing and fully 
clothed in the first stall. The snapping sound came form that only occupied stall. The accused 
stood with her back toward the officer fumbling with something at waist level. The officer 
pushed the door further open and grabbed the accused by the shoulder. She threw a package 
and a balloon in the toilet bowl. These contained heroin. The accused appealed her conviction 
for possession claiming that: 
1. The officer did not have the requisite grounds to search under s. 10 of the Narcotic 
Control Act. 
2. The search by means of which the heroin evidence was obtained was unreasonable and 
in contravention to section 8 of the Charter. 
3. The evidence was inadmissible and should have been excluded in compliance withs. 24 
(2) of the Charter. 
The trial judge had held that the officer's awareness of the activities at the hotel and his 
experience had formed the required grounds to search as he did under the Narcotic Control Act. 
The Supreme Court of BC responded to the grounds for appeal, that the trial judge had 
adequately addressed this issue and had sufficient evidence presented to hold as he did. 
To determine whether the officer contravened the accused's right to be secure against 
unreasonable search or seizure the trial judge had apparently found that the reasonable and 
probable grounds the officer.had to search under the Narcotic Control Act coupled with the 
circumstances, left the accused without any reasonable expectation of privacy. Hence there was 
no such contravention. 
The search had been warrantless. This means that it was ipso facto unreasonable unless the 
Crown shows that it was not. For all other allegations of Charter infringements the onus of 
proving them is on the one who alleges the infringement. Warrantless search and seizure is the 
only exception.24 
24
. Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984) - Volume 18, page 12 of this publication. 
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The test to determine if the accused's right under section 8 was infringed is whether the officer 
had objectively and subjectively reasonable and probable grounds to make the search and if a 
IeaSOnable person in the place of ·the officer would also have similar beliefs. 
In another case25 that originated in the same hotel and the same washroom, .an officer sus.pected 
that someone in a toilet stall was either injecting heroin or retrieving some capsules to supply 
a customer. The officer had stood on the toilet bowl in the adjacent stall and caught the suspect 
in contravention of a narcotic's offence. . In that case the evidence was excluded as the lack of 
grounds to search had caused the exercise to be · unreasonable. 
The accused did rely on that decision and that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in a washroom stall. · 
The Supreme Court rejected the defence arguments and held that the cases were distinguishable. 
In the Pottle case the suspect had the stall door closed; the officer saw under the door that she 
was sitting with her clothing around the ankles; he had no more than suspicion that happened 
to be correct. The circumstances in this case were different - the accused was dressed - the stall 
door was open and sounds that were associated with retrieving drugs from rubber containers was 
heard. He had grounds and the search was reasonable. 
25 Regina v. Pottle - Vancouver CC910714 (B.C.S.C.) 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
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DEFENCE SEEKING DISCWSURE THAT INCLUDED 
POLICE INFORMER DEBRIEFING NOTFS IN AN EFFORT 
TO SHOW INADEQUATE GROUNDS FoR AUTHORIZATION TO 
INTERCEPT PRIVATE COMMUNICATION 
REGINA v. BARZAL et al - Court of Appeal for BC, CA015833, CA015834, CA015835, 
CA015836 AND CA015837. Vancouver Registry, September 1993. 
In this case the validity of the authoriz.ation to intercept private communication was questioned 
by the defence. The lack of complete disclosure by the Crown deprive4 the 5 accused from a 
full answer and defence, it was claimed. The defence demanded not only the affidavits but also 
the debriefing notes made by police regarding the informers. This would undoubtedly identify 
the informers to the defence. The Crown objected. 
After all arguments were heard, the positions by the parties to the proceedings and that of the 
trial judge had not changed. The judge held that the defences of the accused were paramount 
and superseded the public interest in the protection of the informers. The Crown agreed to 
participate in Garofoli26 procedures to test the authorization but asked a blunt question from 
the trial judge. In essence the Crown asked if at the conclusion of the editing hearing "it would 
be your Honour's ruling that all of the edited material, if any, should be disclosed to the 
defence. In those circumstances it is my submission that that would be a fl:'tile and pointless 
exercise to embark upon". The court responded that that would be the ruling. The Crown then, 
to protect the identity of the informers, decided not to call any evidence and acquittals for drug 
charges followed. 
The Crown appealed the acquittal to the Court of Appeal for BC posing one simple question: 
Did the trial judge err in law in ordering the Crown to disclose the informer debriefing notes? 
Everyone involved in the trial recognized the existing informer privileges.27 An informer's 
identity may not be revealed and he or she cannot be called as a witness or be cross-examined 
unless: 
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26 Regina v,. Garofoli [1990] 9 S.C.R. 1421. Also see Volume 40, page 8 of this 
publication. 
v Bisaillon v. Keable et al - 7 C.C.C. (3d) 385. See also Volume 15, page 3 of this 
publication. 
1. the informer is a material witness to the crime; 
2. the informer acted as an agent provocateur, or 
3. where the accused seeks to establish that a search was not undertaken on prerequisite 
grounds and consequently was unreasonable ( s. 8 Charter). 
With regard to 3. above, the Supreme Court of Canada had held in 1990,28 
1. A court must strive to provide the defence with as much evidence as possible, by means 
of editing the information on which a search warrant was based without disclosin~ the 
identity of the informer. 
2. The trial judge had been asked whether the material before the judge who issued the 
authorization disclosed reasonable grounds to believe that an offence was or had been 
committed and if interception of private communication would afford evidence of that 
offence. He simply never answered the question. 
3. The trial judge should have decided whether all or an edited part of the information 
relied upon by the issuing judge should be disclosed to the accused for them to make a 
full answer and defence. 
4. A lot of that information came from informers and the trial judge was obliged to edit that 
material to avoid disclosing the identity of the informers. 
5. The trial judge should also have familiarized himself with the entire content of the 
information placed before the authorizing judge to determine if he or she could conclude 
there were the prerequisite reasonable and probable grounds to issue the authorization. 
This includes a determination if the informers were sufficiently reliable to support those 
grounds. 
In this case, the defence demanded all informer debriefing notes, made by police, to determine 
for themselves if the informers were reliable. Said the BC Court of Appeal: 
"The right to make a full answer and defence is a right to the 
disclosure of material which had been before the authorizing judge. 
It is not a right to embark on a fishing expedition of all the 
material in the possession of police. Such an inquiry could be 
endless" 
28 Regina v. Scott [119] 3. S.C.R. 979 Also see Volume 42, page 12 of this publication. 
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""· The trial judge should have examined and, if necessary, edited the material and disclosed · to the 
defence its content, with effect being given to the "police informer privilege". 
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Crown's appeal allowed. 
Acquittals set aside and new 
trial ordered 
STANDING TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ON 
ACCOUNT OF BREACH OF CHARTER RIGHT: POLICE LISTENING 
WITH UNAIDED EARS AT APARTMENT DOOR FOR GROUND 
TO OBTAIN WARRANT 
REGINA v. SANDHU - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA015539, June .1993 
Due.to.the suspicion on the part ofair-freight-personnel police .became aware of large .amounts 
of cash being shipped to Montreal from .Vancouver and quantities of cocaine being shipped the 
other way. Police allowed the shipments to be delivered. One shipment of cocaine was 
delivered to the addressee who transported it to· another person who in tum took it to an 
apartment occupied by the accused. 
Police made a forced and warrantless entry into the apartment to arrest the accused. They then 
obtained a search warrant and seized the bag containing the cocaine. The accused was convicted 
of possession for the purpose of trafficking. He appealed this conviction claiming unreasonable 
search and seizure in relation to the grey bag that had been sent back and forward between two 
parties who later became co-accused. In other words the accused was not the addresser nor the 
addressee of the bag. When police opened the bag each time it was shipped, the accused had 
no standing to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the bag. If there was a 
breach of the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure in these circumstances 
it was that of the shipper and receiver of the bag. No person must become the beneficiary of 
the infringement of another person's rights or freedoms. This was the Crown's rebuttal to the 
accused's grounds of appeal. 
The Court addressed this broad question specifically as it applies to search and seizure. It is 
clear that the precedents emphasize that the s. 8 Right is not a property but a privacy right. 
Consequently, there must be on the part of the person who claims that this right was infringed, 
a reasonable expectation of privacy. In the case29 where a landlord asked if his tenants would 
keep a quantity of drugs for him and to depose of them as he would direct, the police searched 
the apartment seized the cache and charged the landlord accordingly. He claimed to have 
standing to have the evidence excluded as the search and seizure were unreasonable. This as 
he had a proprietary interest in the apartment block and consequently a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. The Court rejected this argument and held that only the tenant in these 
circumstances had such expectation. 
The Court observed how also with regard to other Charter rights an accused person cannot 
successfully object to the admissibility of evidence unless it was his/her right to freedom that 
was infringed. The language of s. 24(1) of the Charter makes this very clear. Only the person 
29
· Regina v. Pugliese (1992) 71 C.C.C. (3d) 295. (Ontario Court of Appeal) 
45 
··Who's rights wereBllegedly violated can .apply for remedy. · .Only.where .in proceedings under 
subsection (1), the Court finds that evidence was obtained by that breach can inadmissibility of "" 
that evidence be considered under subsection (2). 
,.:;,,ne Court .. held .that the . .accused .had no standing .to objecLto..the.admissibility ... of.evidence 
. · .obtained by police when they searched the grey . bag at the airports in .Vancouver or Montreal. · 
- The accused then objected to the admissibility of the cocaine contained in -the bag after police 
arrested him in his apartment. He argued that police were acting unjustifiable and unlawfully 
when they entered his apartment by force and without warrant to arrest him. He also . claimed 
that what was seized with the subsequent warrant was inadmissible in evidence as it was all part 
of an unreasonable search. The circumstances were as follows: the surveillance team had 
followed the accused's partners in this scheme to the apartment building. Once inside they lost 
him. They showed the manager of the building photographs of the suspects but he could not be 
of any assistance except that he had complaints from tenants about the people in apartment 406. 
The officer looked under the door into the room and saw two pairs of men's shoes. Then they 
put their ears to the door and listened to the conversation concerning to shipments to Montreal 
to a value of $18,000.00. This and other utterances convinced the officers they had found the 
right place. The door was kicked in as the officers yelled: "police". 
The Crown argued that police were justified to effect an arrest under s. 495 C.C. They were 
in "hot pursuit" of their suspect. Not so, rebutted defence counsel. The only thing that led 
them to the apartment was some flimsy information the building manager gave them; the person 
living there was East Indian; and the neighbours had noted suspicious activities. That 
information was not sufficiently reasonable to make it probable that their suspects were in the 
apartment. 
What police did when they got to the apartment amounted to a perimeter search to get the 
grounds they required to justify what they did. Entry of the building and entry of the accused's 
dwelling within that building are distinct from one another. (Regarding entering a dwelling 
under similar circumstances, to effect an arrest, see page 42 of Volume 43 of this 
publication). 30 Should the Court find that the police presence in the building was justified then 
they still had no lawful justification to conduct the "perimeter search" of the accused's dwelling 
(the apartment) by looking under the door and eavesdropping, argued the defence. 
The Court of Appeal for BC found that in the circumstances the police had grounds and rights 
to be in the apartment building. There was no evidence the building was secured or that the 
officers entered surreptitiously. The manager gave tacit permission for them to be there and 
even supplied a key for the accused's apartment. There simply was no trespass solely by the 
police presence outside the apartment. 
30 Regina v. Alfaro - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA014903, March 1993. 
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If police gained reasonable and probable grounds to conclude that an indictable offence was 
-being committed, by listening at the door, then the justification existed. Was the eavesdropping 
an unreasonable search? . Needless .to say, .since no.electronic.,device was -used to interceptthe 
private communication among the three parties in the apartment, including the accused, it was 
, not an unlawful interception -under the privacy provisions in the Criminal Code .. The legal 
. >::~x ·,.- >question to'be.answered was whether the accused and his partners, .. had a reasonable expectation 
. of privacy in regard . to their conversation, when they spokein a normal tone.of voice inside the 
apartment. 
In the US, cases of this kind have made a distinction between hotel · facilities and permanent 
dwellings, granting more right to privacy to the latter. However, the Courts there held that 
when one speaks, regardless at what location, we are at risk of the being overheard by the 
unaided ear. In Canada, the Courts have specifically held that there is no distinction between 
a hotel or like facility and a private home. "All are ·enclaves where we can conduct our 
activities free of uninvited scrutiny". Consequently, society will not tolerate police gathering 
evidence by looking through keyholes or under doors in such private places; nor can it tolerate 
authorities who press their ears up against doors, walls or windows for that purpose. The police 
did thereby conduct a search that was unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter. The warrant 
obtained subsequent to all this was based on that unreasonable search and was unable to validate 
the seizure of the cocaine. 
The Court said that it was significant, however, that the seized evidence (cocaine) was "real" 
evidence. Admission of real evidence rarely causes the fairness of a trial to be affected and in 
this case the accused's trial was fair despite the admission of the cocaine in evidence. 
Police had found themselves in circumstances of urgency and justified fear that the evidence 
would disappear and could not be obtained by alternative investigative techniques. Considering 
they had been in hot pursuit and lost sight of the couriers, police had acted in good faith in 
pressing their ears to the accused's door. Although they were short of having reasonable and 
probable grounds that the persons they had followed were in the apartment they were not without 
some basis to believe that they were. In the circumstances the officers had acted in good faith. 
In addition, the Court of Appeal for BC was not persuaded that the admission of the cocaine in 
evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
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ROADSIDE DEMAND - RESIDUAL ALCOHOL - GROUNDS TO 
MAKE DEMAND FOR SAMPLES TO DETERMINE 
BLOOD I ALCOHOL LEYEL 
REGINA v. BERNSHAW - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA016381, June 1993 
The accused was stopped as he was weaving within his lane. The usual symptoms gave the 
officer reason to believe the accused had alcohol in his system and a demand for a roadside 
breath sample resulted in a "fail" reading. A demand was then made for breath samples and this 
resulted in a conviction for •over 80". The accused appealed the conviction to the Court of 
Appeal for BC claiming that the officer had not ascertained when the accused had his last drink 
and had not waited for at least 15 minutes before he took the accused's roadside breath sample. 
Consequently the Crown failed to show the officer had the requisite reasonable and probable 
grounds to make the demand for breath samples. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the officer must have known that the result of the screening 
device test was possibly inaccurate. The Court drew this inference from the curriculum of the 
training program officers attend to become qualified. This knowledge caused the officer's belief 
that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, not to be grounds 
that were reasonable and probable. 
Accused's appeal allowed, 
Conviction set aside 
Note: 
This decision may cause somewhat a "a damned if you do and a damned if you don't" dilemma. 
had the officer asked the accused when he had his last drink, then, depending on the answer, 
this defence issue may not have arisen. Mind you, a question in cross-examination whether the 
officer could vouch that no belch or other bodily function akin thereto had caused residual 
alcohol to be present in the suspect's mouth, may have resurfaced the problem that a "forthwith" 
compliance with the roadside demand .JilU, to the officer's knowledge have caused the test to 
be inaccurate. 
The Court of Appeal for BC did consider the decisions by the BC Supreme Court in Regina v. 
Gartrell and Regina v. Elder, 31 but found them irrelevant to the issue raised in this Bemshaw 
case. The defence position in Cartrell and Elder had been exclusively on the right to counsel 
when a "roadside" demand is made. Any delay would trigger that right. It's suspension only 
applies when the demand is made as soon as practicable and can be complied with immediately. 
31 See Volume 41, page 21 of this publication (Penticton Registry 18314). 
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In other words, the issue was whether the exclusionary rule under s. · 24(2) Charter should be ., 
involved. 
, ... This Bemshaw decision seems to establish that withoutcertainty on.the part.of police that there 
·is no residual alcohol in the suspect's mouth a "fail" reading on the screening device does not 
give the officer the reasonable and probable grounds prerequisite to a valid demand for breath 
samples to determine blood I alcohol content. This means a 15 minute wait which triggers the 
right to counsel. . (See BC Supreme Court decision in Regina v. Davidson). 32 
32 See Volume 41, page 19 of this publication. 
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DRIVING WHILE KNOWN TO BE SUBJECT 
.TO EPILEPTIC .SEIZURES -·CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE 
REGINA v. GRANT - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA014768, May 1993. 
With the gas' pedal jammed down to the floorboards, the accused drove his car . into an 
intersection and collided with another vehicle. Three persons were seriously injured as a result. 
The accused was convicted of three counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm. He 
appealed these convictions. 
The flooring of the accelerator pedal had been involuntary as the accused had an epileptic seizure 
at the time. His passenger's, attempts to free the pedal from underneath the accused's foot, had 
been to no avail. 
The trial judge had reasoned that the accused knew that he was subject to these seizures. There 
had not been a suspension of the accused's licence to drive but he had been advised by at least 
three physicians that he should not drive. Two of these specialists described the accused as a 
defiant person in the extreme. In spite of extensive discussions with hi111 about the risks 
involved, the accused refused to give up driving. Having received this professional advice the 
accused showed a wanton and reckless disregard for the lives and safety of the persons he 
injured when he chose to continue to drive. 
The Court of Appeal for BC held that the evidence had supported the allegations. 
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Appeal dismissed, 
Convictions upheld 
TRUCK SEIZED FROM ROADSIDE UNDER ASSUMPTION 
R.O. WOULD NOT OBJECT. UNREASONABLE SEIZURE: 
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE. "GOOD FAITH" 
REGINA v. MACKAY· Court of Appeal for BC, Victoria V100947, September 1992. 
A black woman left her home for a morning jog on urban streets. She was never seen again, 
dead or alive. Patches of blood were found on the roadway not far from where she was last 
seen by a paperboy. Broken earmuffs and a shotgun shell were found. Persons living close by 
·had heard one or more shots being fired. 
One month after this disappearance the accused was arrested in an adjacent police jurisdiction 
for a serious sexual attack on a black woman. His pick-up truck was seized as it was believed 
to have been involved in the offence. This truck was the property of the accused although it was 
registered in the accused's girlfriend's name and was in her possession while the accused· was 
in pre-trial custody. After the truck had been searched it was released to the accused's 
girlfriend. 
Shortly after this, the police department investigating the disappearance and apparent murder of 
the jogger received information that the accused had been making statements that he was 
involved in this disappearance. He specifically told how he was trying to sell his truck as it 
likely contained evidence that would link him to the murder of this black woman. He had told 
other inmates that he had killed her and that the crabs had eaten her by now". 
Investigators of both departments got together. Everyone was of the opinion that there were 
insufficient grounds for a search warrant. If one was refused by a Justice of the Peace it could 
weaken or jeopardize the case against the accused. Furthermore seizing the truck by the 
department investigating the jogger's murder could endanger the safety of the informer who 
related the accused's anxiety about getting rid of the truck. It was decided that the department's 
investigators who had arrested the accused for the sexual assault would re-seize the truck so it 
could be thoroughly examined by their colleagues from the adjacent jurisdiction. 
The investigator who had released the truck to the accused's girlfriend went to her apartment 
to request possession of the truck for the purpose of further examination. She was not home, 
and the truck was parked at the curbside. The officer had in the past received nothing but 
cooperation from the accused's girlfriend. His interviews with her had all been friendly. The 
Court saw them as "lengthy and harmonious" and found that he did get along well with her. 
It had therefore been reasonable for the officer to believe that he would receive her consent to 
re-seize the truck. The officer had received compliments from defence counsel at the 
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conclusion of his cross-examination and the Court had found him "entirely credible". Hence the 
, Court did accept .that when the officer had the truck .towed away .without consent of. the 
accused's girlfriend he did believe she would have given it. 
By examining the outside of the truck, an identification officer of the department investigating 
: C«'the murder of.the black jogger found, in the undercarriage of the.truck.a pompom similar to .the 
one that was part of the tuque belonging to the black jogger. The pompom had a negroid hair 
embedded in it. This became weighty evidence at trial. 
The accused was convicted of first degree murder. The Crown had presented evidence from 
which it wanted the jury to infer that the accused had deliberately run over the jogger, got out 
of the truck and finished her off with a pry bar and shotgun. Needless to say, the pompom was 
important to support this theory. 
The defence appealed the conviction to the Court of Appeal for BC. One of the main issues was 
the admissibility of the "pompom evidence". The defence claimed that the warrantless re-seizure 
of the truck was in essence a theft and had violated the accused's right to be secure against such 
seizures. This caused the discovery of the pompom that linked the accused by means of real 
evidence to the murder of the woman. Even Crown Counsel at trial had admitted that the 
seizure of the truck had been unreasonable and needless to say, the defence was not prepared 
to disagree with the Crown's sympathetic position. This caused the BC Court of Appeal to hold 
that it was not necessary for them to decide on this "interesting question" (see comments below). 
All the Court would deal with in relation to the conceded unreasonable seizure, was whether the 
evidence was nevertheless admissible. 
The trial judge had held that the intrusion on the privacy of the accused had been minimal; the 
evidence was real and found without any assistance of the accused; the breach had been of a 
technical nature only; there was an urgency in view of the accused wanting to get rid of the 
truck; the actions of the seizing officer had been deliberate but not flagrant or wilful; and the 
officer had acted in good faith. 
The BC Court of Appeal disagreed that police had acted in good faith. The officers knew and 
admitted that they had no grounds for a search warrant and yet they proceeded. However, 
although there was "bad faith" .in ,the seizure of the .truck, there was no bad faith in the 
examination of the exterior of the vehicle and the taking of the pompom. As a matter of fact 
that examination could have been done at the curb where the truck was parked. 
In the circumstances, said the Court: 
" ..... the admission of the evidence so obtained would not bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute to anything like the extent 
of its exclusion would do." 
If there was an infringement of the accused's Charter right under s. 8, it was by means of a 
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minor intrusion. The defence apparently had relied heavily on the Kokesch and Klimchuk13 
. •· _, ... ,cases., The.BC Court of Appeal .held that those cases were .distinguishable . .In .Kokesch there 
was a trespass on private property on -the part of the police and in Klimchuk there -had been no .. 
urgency; the search involved the interior of the vehicle; the charge was far less ·serious; and no 
informer needed protection. 
Comment: 
The appeal was dismissed in 
regard to the .admissibility of 
the evidence. 
It was quite clear that the Crown had, at trial, prematurely conceded that the re-seizure of the 
truck was unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter . . If it was unreasonable, then whose right to 
be secure against unreasonable seizure was violated? The accused's or his girlfriend's? It was 
clearly the girlfriend who was the registered owner and possessor of the truck despite the fact 
that the accused had property interest in the vehicle. The Courts would likely have held that the 
privacy interest with regard to the truck was that of the girlfriend. If that privacy right had been 
violated the accused is not entitled to a remedy or have the exclusion of evidence rule applied 
in his favour. Only the person whose rights are violated has standing under s. 24 of the Charter. 
33 Regina v. Kokesch - Volume 39, page 6 of this publication, Supreme Court of Canada 
Regina v. Klimchuk - Volume 40, page 19 of this publication, BC Court of Appeal 
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THREAT TO Kll..L ANY POLICE' OFFICER WHO WILL 
CAUSE THE DEATH OF A BLACK PERSON 
REGINA v. REMY - Quebec Court of Appeal, 82 C.C.C. (3d) 176, April 1993. 
The accused requested an interview with a reporter in the wake of police killing of two black 
persons. He told the reporter that any police officer who would kill a black person in 
circumstance as nebulous as those surrounding the death of those two black men, would be 
killed. He claimed that a number of terrorists were on stand by and.waiting for police to slip-
up. The reporter wrote the article and read out the text to the accused over the telephone. He 
seemed to agree with the article's content. Consequently the accused was convicted of •uttering, 
conveying or causing anyone to receive a threat to cause death or serious bodily harm to any 
person". The accused appealed this conviction to the Court of Appeal for Quebec, 
The law with regard to this offence is quite clear. The wrongful act is the uttering, conveying 
or causing anyone to receive a threat. Whether or not an accused person had any intention to 
carry out the threat is irrelevant. The intent the Crown is required to show is a subjective one -
was there on the part of the accused an intent to threaten another person. The remedial objective 
of the section is to protect against fear and intimidation by means of uttering threats. 
In this case, via the media, death threats were conveyed to the police or police officers. This 
the defence argued was not to anyone specific. The accused made it clear that he only 
threatened officers who, in future, would kill a black person. The Court responded that 
considering the objective of the section "it is sufficient that the identity of the police officer will 
become known when the condition set out in the threat is eventually met". 
Finally the defence submitted that if the remedial aspect of the section is to protect citizens from 
fear and intimidation there is no victim in this case. Not only, as mentioned above, was it 
sufficient that the victim of this threat would become known when the condition spelled out in 
the threat is met, but the Court also found that "a threat to cause the death of a member of an 
ascertained group of citizens contravenes this section". 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
Note: Remy has filed notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada~ 
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IS A SUBMACHINE GUN TIIAT CAN BE CONVERTED TO AN 
AUTQMATIC STATUS A PROHIBITED WEAPON? 
REGINA v. HASSELW ANDER - Supreme Court of Canada [1993) 2 S.C.R. 398. 
Mr. Hassel wander owned a mini-uzi submachine gun and attempted to get it registered.· The 
local registrar seized the weapon as he considered it to be a prohibited weapon. Although the 
gun was manufactured as a semi-automatic weapon and was such when ·presented for 
registration, a rather simple adjustment (one of three) would convert the gun to a fully automatic 
firearm. 
The lower Courts of Ontario agreed with the registrar while the. Court of Appeal held that the 
words "capable of firing bullets in rapid succession during one pressure of the trigger" in the 
definition of prohibited weapon mean and refer to the "present firing ability of the weapon" and 
not to conversion possibilities. · The Crown appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of 
Canada (S.C.C.). 
By majority (two justices dissented) the S.C.C. held that the firearm was a prohibited weapon 
and not merely restricted. It reasoned that the word "capable" includes an aspect of potential 
capability for conversion to a fully automatic firearm in a relatively short period of time with 
reasonable ease. The section was created to protect the public from dangerous weapons that kill 
and maim people. To hold otherwise would undermine the purpose of the legislation. 
Consequently, prohibited weapon includes a firearm that can quickly and r~dily be converted 
to an automatic status. 
Crown's appeal allowed 
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FATHER TAPING RANSOM DEMANDS REGARDING 
KIDNAPPED SON - ADMISSIBILITY OF TAPES 
REGINA v. TAM et al - BC Supreme Court, CC920382, Vancouver, Aprll 1993. 
A business man was kidnapped in BC'slower mainland. His father received ransom calls at his 
- ·•home in Taiwan from public BC telephones and.later from Hong Kong .. The father ;·totally .upon 
his own initiative, without advise from police, taped all of the ransom calls. Ransom money was 
delivered to persons in Hong Kong and the son was released in BC. Five persons were arrested 
and tried in BC Supreme Court for kidnapping and extortion. 
The ransom calls were adduced in evidence and a voir dire was held to determine the 
admissibility of the tapes. Defence counsel argued that the tapes were the result of unlawful 
interceptions of private communications. He claimed that police were aware that calls were 
intercepted and consequently the father was an agent of the police and that rendered the tapes 
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the father's consent to use them as evidence.34 He also 
submitted that the interceptions had amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 
of the Charter. 
The Court held that the father as the victim of the crime of extortion was not an agent of the 
State. He had already started taping before police were involved and would have continued to 
do so. His sole concern was the safety of his son and he acted as a father rather than a police 
agent. Consequently the Charter did not apply. 
In terms of the privacy provisions in the Criminal Code of Canada, the Court held that the 
accused had made their calls from numerous locations to prevent detection and had mad.e other 
moves that clearly indicated that they had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Therefore their 
communications were not made "under the circumstances in which it is reasonable ...... to 
expect" that they will not be intercepted. 
Taped communication allowed m 
evidence 
34 Regina v. Duarte - Volume 36, page 1 of this publication. Also 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1. 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
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TIDBITS 
SKATEBOARDS IN SHOPPING MALL - OWNER USING FORCE 
TO REMOVE SKATER - ASSAULT - THREATENING 
The accused owned a shopping mall where young skateboard artists had become a real problem. 
Signs were placed everywhere clearly indicating that skateboarding was not allowed. A young 
.man .came into the mall to purchase something in .one of.the stores . .. When he left .he used .his 
skateboard and a planter as a skateboard wall. The accused grabbed the young man by. the 
throat, shook him and said, "If I see you around, I'll kill you". He was consequently convicted 
of assault and uttering a death threat. The accused appealed arguing that the Court had failed 
to consider that the youth, who originally was an invitee became a trespasser when he used his 
skateboard. The accused has a right to use force to remove trespassers from the property. The 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held that the judge had erred when he refused to consider the 
applicability of the trespass provisions of the Criminal Code. Appeal was allowed and a new 
trial was ordered. 
Regina v. Keating - 76 C.C.C. (3d) 570. November 1992. 
******* 
IMPLIED CONSENT TO SEARCH - REASONABLE SEARCH 
The accused had two stolen commercial semi-trailers in his farm yard. Police entered the yard 
and approached the accused to talk to him about the presence of the trailers. One officer asked 
the accused for permission to look inside the trailers. The accused raised no objection and the 
officer assumed consent. One trailer contained a large quantity of pork - which was also stolen 
property. The accused was convicted of possession of stolen property and appealed this 
conviction to the BC Court of Appeal claiming that the search was unreasonable. Part of the 
argument was that the search was warrantless while police searched the trailer~ with the implied 
rather than the explicit consent of the accused. The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds for 
appeal. Police had every right to enter the property to speak to the accused. . He did not ask 
them to leave but instead invited them in for coffee. In regard to the consent to search the 
trailer the Court held that it can, "effectively be given without particular formality, even in a 
cursory fashion 11 • Considering all of the circumstances permission had been given and the search 
was reasonable. The accused's appeal was dismissed. 
Regina v. Duncan - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA015384, March 1993. 
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OBSCENE MESSAGE DICTATED INTO ANSWERING MACHINE 
AMOUNTS TO OBSCENE PHONE CALL 
The accused put an indecent message on tpe complainants answering machine with the intent to 
alarm or annoy the complainant. He appealed his conviction for the offence as ·he had not 
directly conveyed his message to "that person". The delay in the message reaching the person 
the accused intended it for did not take away from the fact the call was made.to "thatperson". 
The words spoken do not have to be contemporaneously heard. 
Regina v. Manicke - Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan, 81 C.C.C. (3d) 255. 
******* 
IS OFFERING TO GIVE A SAMPLE OF BWOD A 
REASONABLE EXCUSE TO REFUSE TO GIVE 
SAMPLES OF BREA TH? 
The accused failed to comply with a breath-sample demand and was charged accordingly. The 
trial judge had found that the accused had had a reasonable excuse as he had offered to give a 
sample of blood instead. He had done so in a sincere belief that a blood analysis is more 
accurate than that of breath. The Crown appealed the acquittal to the Court of Appeal for BC. 
It held that, as a matter of law, the offer by and the opinion of the accused could not amount 
to a reasonable excuse. When the demand is made the accused is obligated to comply. The 
preference for an alternative means to establish the blood/alcohol content cannot negate the 
lawful demand and excuse a suspect from complying. 
Crown's appeal allowed 
Conviction registered 
Regina v. Taylor - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA015716, February, 1993. 
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ACCUSED NOT IDENTIFIED IN COURT -
IDENTIFICATION BY CONTINUITY 
At his trial for "Over 80" the accused and a "look;a-like" were sitting in the Court's gallery. 
When the investigating officer in his testimony was asked to identify the accused he identified 
the look-a-like. The defence moved for dismissal but the trial judge declined. He said that the 
accused had identified himself with a driver's licence that had a picture of him on its surface. 
That person the officer arrested, processed and issued an Appearance Notice to was on the Court 
file and its number appears on the Information. The person who appeared before the Court in 
compliance to that notice had the same name as the person who identified himself by means of 
the pictured driver's licence. That person pleaded not guilty through his counsel. It was 
therefore obvious that the person who was passed out behind the wheel of his car at the scene 
and who, by means of the driver's licence identified himself and the person who pleaded not 
guilty and was now in Court to stand trial were one and the same person. On appeal by the 
accused the BC Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge and the ....... appeal was dismissed. 
Regina v. Walters - BC Supreme Court, New Westminster X03355, October 1992. 
******* 
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MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS FOR ARMED ASSAULT AND 
POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DANGEROUS TO THE PUBLIC PEACE 
The accused had gone to the apartment of a man she had a fierce dispute with for some time . 
. She held a replica of .45 calibre pistol a few inches from his forehead and said that he was going 
to pay for all the trouble he had caused. The man got away from her and phoned police. The 
accused was arrested two hours later and a BB gun, that was the replica, was found in her car. 
She was convicted of carrying a weapon while committing assault and having possession of a 
weapon dangerous to the public peace. The accused argued before the Court of Appeal for BC 
that the conviction of armed assault precluded a conviction for possession of a weapon dangerous 
to the public peace. Both counts of the indictment arose from the same delict and incident, 
hence the charges overlapped despite the fact that neither is included in the other. 35 The BC 
Court of Appeal agreed that when a conviction was entered for the armed assault the possession 
of a weapon charge should have been stayed. Appeal allowed. 
Regina v. Briscoe - Vancouver CA013553, September 1992. 
******* 
DISCHARGE IS NOT IBE EQUIVALENT OF CONVICTION 
FOR PURPOSE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION TO DETERMINE CREDIBILITY 
The accused testified in his own defence. Crown Counsel cross-examined him regarding 
credibility and asked him if it was true that he had been found guilty and received a conditional 
discharge for fraud. The trial judge had obviously been influenced by this when he considered 
the accused's credibility. This sort of cross-examination is allowed under s. 12 (1) of the 
Cariada Evidence Act where a witness has been convicted of any offence. Holding that a 
discharge is not a conviction the Quebec Court of Appeal found that the provision in s. 12 
C.E.A. did not apply. Conviction for assault set aside; .new.trial ordered. 
Regina v. Dodge - 81 C.C.C. (3d) 433 
35
. Kienapple v. The Queen [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729. 
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POLICE HAVING TO RE-ENACT STATEMENT 
TAKING TO ENHANCE CREDIBILITY 
A police officer ·testified how he had taken a statement from the accused in eight minutes. 
-.-- ;· .; '~ During the voir dire .the·defence claimed that .. the officer was not credible with-regard to events 
ancillary to the statement. Defence counsel sought leave to have the officer perform in the 
courtroom the "form and substance" of the statement taking - a sort of re-enactment of ,that 
scene. Despite the Crown's objections claiming impossible duplication that would not shed any 
more light on the situation than th~ officer's detailed testimony, the Court granted the 
application. . ~ 
Regina v. Brooks - 81 C.C.C. (3d), Ontario Gen. Div. Court 
******* 
CAN IBE CROWN COMPEL A PERSON CHARGED 
SEPARATELY w1m mE SAME OFFENCE TO TESTIFY? 
The accused youth was tried for a Break and Enter offence. Another youth was separately 
charged with the very same break and enter. This youth was subpoenaed to testify at the 
accused's trial. The trial judge found that this violated the accused youth's rights under s. 7 of 
the Charter. He quashed the subpoena and the Crown found itself with inadequate evidence to 
convict the accused. The resulting acquittal was appealed. The Court of Appeal for Ontario 
held that the testimony of the youth separately charged with the same offence, does not violate 
the fundamental principles of justice. The accused's right to silence is not absolute and exist 
side by side with the compellability of a witness charged separately with the same offence arising 
from the same delict. That witness, of course, is protected bys. 13 of the Charter with regard 
to that testimony being used at his own trial. Acquittal set aside, new trial ordered. 
Regina v. R.J.S. - 80 C.C.C. (3d) 397, Court of Appeal for Ontario 
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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE ORIGINATING FROM DIGITAL 
RECORDER INSTALLED BY TELEPHONE COMPANY 
The accused made for four years threatening and obscene phone calls, identifying himself as an 
"..... -·:-..employee.of a radio station. The telephone company,received information that made the accused 
a suspect. The company iristalled a digital number recorder on the circuits of the accused's 
phone and the case against the accused was based entirely on what the recorder had revealed. 
The accused argued that the "recorder" evidence was inadmissible due to various Charter 
violations the installation and monitoring of · his calls had caused. The Court of Appeal for 
Ontario held that the company was not an Agent of the State when it recorded the accused's 
calls. Furthermore the gadget only records what numbers are dialled from the accused's phone 
and does not intercept any private oral communication. The evidence was admissible. 
Regina v. Fegan - 80 C.C.C. (3d) 356, April 1993. 
******* 
ROADSIDE REFUSAL, OFFENCE COMPLETE UPON 
FIRST REFUSAL 
The accused was stopped for having made a U-tum. Due to lack of sobriety the officer made 
a demand for a breath sample for the screening device. The accused instantly refused. The 
officer then prepared a traffic ticket for a U-tum, a 24-hour Suspension Notice and an 
Appearance Notice for the refusal. After a 15-minute period he again made a demand for breath 
samples and again it was refused. No Charter rights were given to the accused. The trialjudge 
held that the precedents regarding a 15 minute wait amounting to a detention that does require 
a "right to counsel" warning, were distinguishable from what happened here. In this case the 
demand was made right away and instantly refused. The preparing of the documents took some 
time at the end of which the officer gave the accused another opportunity to comply. She 
refused again. The offence was complete before the 15 minute wait. The accused appealed the 
conviction to the BC Supreme Court, to no avail. That Court held that the trial judge had not 
misconstrued the evidence in finding that the offence had been completed before the detention 
began where the accused should have been told of her right to counsel. Appeal dismissed. 
Regina v. Hunter - BC Supreme Court, Prince George 22974, September 1992 
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PERSON WHO-POSSESSED MONEY AND CHEQUES, HE ADMITI'ED 
WERE STOLEN, CLAIMING TO HAVE RIGHT TO RETAIN POSSESSION 
UNLESS SUPERIOR CLAIM IS SHOWN 
., · . Mr. Baird raised the .suspicion of hotel staff when he requested :that a very large .amount-Of cash 
and travellers cheques be placed in .the safe . . They_.notified .police.- ,The. next.day .the .Toronto 
Police requested assistance in the apprehension of Mr .. Baird as he was suspected of having been 
involved in the robbery of an armoured car. The suspect was arrested and questioned. In 
essence he confessed that the money and cheques were stolen but as he did not trust •cops• he 
was not prepared to say anymore. His lawyer advised him to demand the money and cheques 
back. For reasons not revealed Mr. Baird was released and not charged with ~ything. He took 
action against the police for the return of the valuables. He took the position that unless either 
the person he stole the valuables from or another person who has superior title would show up, 
he was entitled to retain possession of the valuables. 
Considering the admission by Mr. Baird that the money and the cheques were stolen, the Court 
of Appeal for BC said, 
11
••••• people would regard that result (the Crown retaining 
possession) as more consistent with the imperatives of justice and 
equity than the return of the funds to the pocket book of Mr. 
Baird ..... II 
Application denial was upheld, Baird's appeal was dismissed. 
Martin Baird v The Queen - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA0122S4, September 
1993. 
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THE CANADIAN CONCEPT OF POLICE INDEPENDENCE -
POLICE SEPARATION FROM POLITICS 
Due to an apparent unawareness of these concepts at political, judicial and police levels, 
principles are being eroded by an evolutionary process that ought to concern us. 
Recent attempts by entities within the police community to influence the preferences of the 
electorate in municipal elections are clear symptoms of that erosion and prompted these 
observations. 
The following is a synopsis of "The Concept of Police Independence" in the "Legal Status of 
the Police" published by the Law Reform Commission of Canada: 
1. Operational police decisions are matters reserved to the force itself. 
2. The authority of the individual constable to investigate crime, to arrest suspects, 
and to lay informations before justice of the peace comes from the common law, 
constitutional conventions and statutes consistent with these fundamental 
principles. This concept and authority must not be interfered with by any 
political or administrative person or body. Only overall policies, objectives and 
goals are matters that properly belong to civilian authority and police boards have 
the duty to see to it that the force operates within these policies and has the right 
to hold the Chief Constable accountable for these matters. That civilian board is 
the employer and management of the force. The Chief Constable is its Chief 
Executive Officer and has the general supervision of the force. 
This is a concise and accurate summation of what the paper claims to be the common law and 
generally the statutory structures created in the nations belonging to the British Commonwealth. 
This separation from administrative and political bodies or persons is reciprocal and in terms of 
involvement, a two-way street. It is unthinkable in our system of government for police to be 
subject to political whims or biases. It is equally unthinkable for police to be involved in 
politics. The purpose for the independence would become an illusion; an unrealistic and 
unnecessary element of the principles upon which "policing" is based. It also would erode and 
reduce the credibility and impartial image of police at all levels and eventually be seen as a 
politically controlled entity and office. Actions or involvement of police in politics will be the 
equivalent of kicking a door open from the inside that was kept locked to keep the unwanted out. 
The preamble to our constitution has since 1867 included a phrase that has married us to 
centuries of customs, conventions and traditions, many of which have been judicially crystallized 
into law. It simply states that we desire a constitution similar in principle to that of the United 
Kingdom. Due to the uniqueness of that unwritten constitution we are totally distinct from our 
neighbour to the south, who wrote in the wake of their revolt against British rule, a constitution 
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that democratized . all public offices, including many key positions in their justice system, with 
ultimate power and control conferred on elected officials. These well intended provisions 
created a greater vulnerability to corruption than we have. Corruption is a malignancy. 
When the current BC Police Act was drafted some 20 years ago, ultimate care was taken to 
comply with our desired principles. Many submissions and suggestions were rejected for 
inclusion. Some had obvious hidden agendas others considered only administrative convenience. 
Most of these would have breached conventions and jeopardized police independence. 
Particularly from politically oriented sources it was reasoned that as the police costs then on 
average, approached 20% of the municipal budgets, police should be employed and managed by 
an elected body; or for the civilian board to oversee police, to be a committee of the municipal 
council. These and many other proposals were intensely debated and rejected on the basis that 
the length of the proverbial arm that is to keep politics away from policing would simply be too 
short. The two essential elements of democratic government are representation and 
responsibility. Under our system, the former is not always direct or original where it would 
infringe a doctrinal separation. of powers. 
Sometimes the executive branch of government as well as subordinate governments (municipal 
councils) have the responsibility "to see to it" that services are adequate without having 
operational control or ability to interfere with original discretionary powers or duties of officials 
to which independence or separation applies. "Original", refers here to the statutes or common 
law speaking directly to persons holding these offices when conferring these powers. 
This causes them to be free agents, consequently the constructive vicarious liability provisions 
in our statutes. In other democracies, police are "agents" and even known by that title. In those 
systems the minister who has the police service included in his/her portfolio usually has 
considerable power and political prestige because of it. It is also remarkable to note that in 
places where being the political head of police means power, how this brings out the herding 
instincts resulting in massive centralizations and consolidations under the predictable guise of 
efficiency. 
Our only check and balance system is with our independent judiciary. However, since the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect, the Courts are frequently referring to the 
police as "the State" at stages of this function where they have not joined the State or Crown in 
its prosecutorial interest. One of our Justices at a superior court level surprisingly reasoned 
recently that the Attorney-General had control over police and was ultimately responsible for 
police behaviour at discretionary and investigative levels. The only revealing utterances from 
the Bench in this regard, come from a superior court level with regard to a no-tolerance order 
a provincial executive branch had imposed on police. The Court observed that such an order 
could by the minister responsible for prosecutorial services be imposed on his/her agents 
(prosecutors) but not on police as that would amount to an interference in original discretionary 
powers of the "peace officer". 
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Concepts that jeopardize police independence have by monotonous exposure crept north across 
the 49th parallel. They have by decades of repetition subtly caused misconceptions about our 
own system that has too many quality features to not oppose this evolution, that will when 
completed, have caused a quantum and a predictably unwanted change. 
The apparent lack of interest in who the "constable" is, what "office" he/she holds in terms of 
mandate and place in society's structure, at nearly all levels within our power sources allows this 
regrettable erosion to continue. The intended status of that office is in jeopardy; its 
independence demanded or offered at the altar of politics; and its image of . impartiality is 
diminishing. · 
It is impossible in these few lines and this limited space, to touch on all ancillary issues or 
discuss other evidence of this erosion. The object of this writing has been met if the reader 
draws the irresistible inference that police involvement in any public election, is unbecoming and 
inconsistent with the status entrusted to them. 
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